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ON THE COVER:
IN LIEU OF LAW REPORTS

The

pamphlet reproduced

on

the

cover

is

one

of several dozen so-called

from Tudor-Stuart times which have been located and
School Professor John H. Langbein. They constitute
has

not

been used in prior

Langbein's problem
which

no

law reports

employed
a

genre of

"chap-books"
by Law

in recent work
source

material which

legal historical research.

was

were

to find

evidence of the criminal process for a period in
for the celebrated political trials, lawyers

produced. "Except

usually involved either in prosecuting or defending cases of serious crime,"
Langbein explains. "Consequently, law reports-which are lawyers' literature-did not
develop. The political trials reported in the State Trials are misleading in a number of
respects when we want to trace the history of ordinary criminal procedure at common
law. Some records do survive in the archives, and the practical
legal literature of the
period can shed light on particular problems. But the chap-books are the only narrative
sources I know for the
ordinary criminal process in the decisive period under Elizabeth
and James I when the outline of modern criminal procedure began to take
shape."
were

not

In his

forthcoming

book" Mr.

Langbein says:
pamphlets were written by non-lawyers for sale to the general public. The
authors are generally anonymous or identified by initials only. In the era before
newspapers the chap-books held the place of the sensation-mongering element of
the modern press. They were almost all published in London and offered for sale
there, even when the events being reported occurred distantly. The crimes which
the pamphlets narrate break down into three somewhat overlapping
categories,
each having a manifest appeal to sensation-seeking readers: (1) especially grue
some murders, often involving dismemberment or the
burning of the corpse;
(2) crimes of witchcraft (easily the most numerous); and (3) crimes of betrayal
These

against

master. Persons of gentle status appear as
culprits and
surprising proportion of the pamphlets, esecially in non-witchcraft
cases; perhaps it excited the readership when felony overflowed its normal course
within the lower orders. Not infrequently the pamphlets feature crude drawings
on the title page, for
example, the witch with her demons, the dismembered
corpse, or the hanged felons dangling in their nooses. Timeliness aids sensation;
the pamphlets appeared quite rapidly after the events-occasionally even before
execution of sentence. The risk of being scooped by a competitor may also have
pressured the entrepreneurs of the trade into producing their pamphlets promptly
a

victims in

spouse

or

a

a

after the events. Their timeliness is one of the factors which enhances the re
liability of the chap-books as a legal historical source. These crimes were not
legends embellished over long years of retelling. What really interested the
author and his audience, and occasionally did produce exaggeration, was the
gore of the crime and the drama of the culprit's downfall. The witchcraft
pamphlets, the only ones to have attracted much scholarly attention, have been
regularly verified when checked against surviving legal records.

"Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance: England, Germany, France (American Society for Legal
History: Studies in Legal History. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (1974).
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Crosskey, Anastaplo
and Meiklejohn on

3

the United States Constitution

Malcolm P.

Sharp

*

I

A

lexander

Meiklejohn, George Anastaplo and
Crosskey have made contributions

William W.

understanding of the Constitution which are
not adequately appreciated or understood. As our
discussion proceeds, we shall find Hugo L. Black's
ideas appearing and reappearing in such a way that
he may be considered a fourth major figure in our
to

an

reflections.

1

Meiklejohn made the systematic argument
for an unqualified First Amendment which has
strengthened and influenced the position of Mr.
Justice Black, and-sporadically-the position of
the Supreme Court of the United States." Mr.
Anastaplo has since strengthened that position
further by establishing, among other perhaps more
important things, that the unqualified application
Mr.

of the First Amendment is consistent

required by,

with, if

of the Constitution. They have however
subject to so many glosses that the argument
for the simple meaning has itself become complex
and startling. It seems however to be worthwhile to
5
make that argument as simple as possible.
We shall start with Mr. Crosskey's Politics and
the Constitution': His principal concern is with the
economic matters subject, under the Constitution,

reading
been

to

Congress and the Supreme
comparison is possible these matters

the control of. the

Court. If
seem

to

a

me

less important than the human values
so with the

associated with communication, and
freedom

of

speech

Amendment. Nevertheless, it

Crosskey, and
neglected criteria

with Mr.

so

some

of

the

by

protected
seems

First

useful to start

become

acquainted

judicial

decision.

with

not

the meaning of its words at the time of
Crosskey has recreated a

II

their enactment.P Mr.
doctrine of

general power, particularly

the part of the Congress and the
which was the doctrine of the
Court,
Supreme
draftsmen, though the vagaries of change and

matters,

politics

on

have obscured it:'

It may be useful now to state and consider these
new doctrines in their simplest and broadest form.

The doctrines

high

are

themselves

simple,

school student would expect

1.

in economic

and what

on

a

The criteria may be derived from Mr. Justice
Black's recent observations, particularly his objec
tions

in

dissenting opinions

two

Court

careful

its

own

assumptions. At the

that of Chief
ments

Professor of
Chicago

Law

Emeritus,

The

University of

7

is the

To
re

before he

...

doubt that Mr.

*

the

making

the Constitution is what the
judge, that"
it
is."
BEach
position of course starts from
judges say

was a
a

to

"constitutional convention."

Supreme
these observations, a familiar rejoinder
mark by Charles Evans Hughes, made
a

Justice
Justice Hughes

expressed

We may test

utility

same

of those

time it is hard to

Black's view is closer than
to

the

practical judg

in the text of the Constitution.
our

views about the wisdom and

judgments,

and get

some

experience

Mr.

Crosskey's
treatment of the powers of Congress, particularly in
economic matters, and the powers of the Supreme
Court. His position is that the Commerce Clause,
the grant of powers to the Supreme Court, and the
implications of the references to "general Welfare"
in their

4

application, by following

in the Preamble and among the

grants of power to

Congress, give general legislative power to Congress,
subject only to exceptions provided for in the
Constitution. We shall consider first, somewhat
more

the effect of the Commerce Clause

narrowly,

Congress an'd the theory of the
general prevalence of state law, particularly com
mercial private law, in the United States Courts.
on

the powers of

The Constitution
have Power
,

.

.

.

to

provides: "The Congress shall
regulate Commerce with for-

eign Nations, and among the several States, and
with

the Indian Tribes

assembled

society

a

.

.

Crosskey has

." Mr.

number of meanings, current in the
was drafted and

in which the Constitution

adopted,
ing was
meaning

for "commerce." A quite
"gainful activity," and if

common mean
a

more

limited

understood, it is hard to under
stand why that limited meaning was not made
explicit. "Among" meant, then as now, "in the
midst of," but it was used somewhat more generally
than it is now. We would employ today one
was

example used

to

be

in conversation

by Mr. Crosskey,

"the

An effort to

Congress over
bankruptcy as itself limiting the powers of states
over insolvency problems was defeated early in our
history. There is no sufficient reason to think that
the Commerce Clause itself

original

its

power

context

"Commerce

contemporary reader

We observe that these

be associated with

Eighteenth Century

practical effect,
ing

so

case

worked out its

virtually

all

gainful activity.
"amongv'[j on

"between" for

Supreme

Court has created its

and has

thereby

"with the state" in

...

with

the other

recognize that

daily situations,

the

uses

more

Nations

foreign

"
...

prohibiting state action on
"among" the states generally.

as

deal

it is not "with"

...

The Commerce Clause became in 1873

a

part of

evolving system of protections to business against
both state and national governments. Its first uses
an

were

against states, and gradually fitted

into the

doctrines of economic substantive due process of
that, among other things, invalidated much

legislation,

in

a

line of decisions which

began

to be overruled and corrected in 1937.

The Clause
on

was

first treated

as

including a limit
refining
"among"

decision that sugar
and not "commerce" or

federal power in

a

words of the Commerce Clause, granting power to
Congress but not saying "only" to Congress, as

itself

we

:"

..

"states," and

by

when

vivid expressions:
and"
among

Anti-Trust Act.12 Another famous

commercial matters

hand, the
meaning

a

manufacturing

the Clause

to

limited

own

the

the powers of states in the absence of
Congressional action. It was impossible to think of

applies

In the substitution of

was

on

mean

group or community. Instead of
to domestic and foreign commerce,

territory but with

referring bluntly

now

obscured what it has done with

"commerce." We all

"

extended

own

that the Commerce Clause

the limited territorial aspects of state government.
These steps made it possible to treat the affirmative

limits

mean

of "commerce," are,
ings, except perhaps
when we look at the words, our own as well. In the
case of "commerce" the Supreme Court has now, in
in the

labor

to

be reminded

must

without reference to hunks of land.

authoritatively limited to "be
The Case of the State Freight
in
tween" until 1873,
10
Tax. As a result, "commerce" came to mean gainful
came

regulate

repeatedly
gainful activity, that
"among" included but was not limited to "between:'
and that "states" meant groups of people, with or

law

and "state"

states

that "commerce" included all

"state's" boundaries.

exchange,

generally

to

among the several States." The

...

the several States

not

between

frictions

in the exercise of its power

states; but we would be unlikely to say, as one did in
the Eighteenth Century, that SOmeone died of poison

was

to be understood in

automatically abolishing state
It did give Congress power

deal with economic

to

the Constitution

"Among"

as

was

over commerce.

ravages of the boll weevil among the southern states:'
including but not limited to ravages "between" the

"among some clam SOUp."9 When we speak of a
person going to work for the "state" we understand
well enough that we are speaking of a particular
group of people, whose activities and relationships
may among other things extend far beyond a

power of

interpret the

so

not

subject

to

the Sherman

case

held child

labor in factories to be
"commerce among the

lation

13

manufacturing and not
states" and so beyond regu

by Congress.
The systematic overruling of these last two cases
began in 1937, and has continued without any

explicit verbal correction of
which they were supposed

the
to

general doctrine by
justified. Even a

be

small field of grain for home use may now be
subject, as part of a total scheme of agricultural
to control

adjustment,

Act of

by

and hours of work may be

Congress." Wages
subject to an Act of
and

manufacturing industry,"
hospitals which buy considerable
amounts of supplies and equipment outside the
boundaries of their "states.Ts Desegregation at lunch
counters may be required by Act of Congress where
in

Congress,

even

in schools and

substantial

amounts

of

a

lunch counter's

supplies

from outside the boundaries of its state," And

come

depending if necessary
on private force for collection-may be subjected to
punishment by Act of Congress," The one dissenting
Justice observed, it seems correctly, that the gener
now

"loan sharks" -lenders

alizations about the "interstate" effects of crime

applied

in this

case

apply

also to

a

large

number of

other crimes, indeed to "crime in the streets" gener

the fact that its

by

possession had been impeded by the course of an
Indian war before the states's statutory period
In
necessary to give the company title had passed.
the confusion of events individual settlers had taken

possession, who

challenged the company's
period of Indian

now

contention that it could count the

occupation

in

its time of

computing

purposes of the

controlling
mediate Pennsylvania state

decided

a

first

and unfavorable

acquiesce
case

by

in

case

An inter

to

court

of

appeals had

way favorable to the settlers

a

the company. The

Supreme

inactive state

possession for

state statute.

Court

was

relatively
eventually to

in the final determination of

the United States

Supreme

a

second

Court. In that

second case, the company relied on the parties'
diversity of state citizenship to litigate the matter in
the federal courts and

finally

in the United States

Supreme Court.
In the extensive arguments characteristic of the

time, counsel engaged in the Supreme Court appar

ally.
A considerable number of related
in the end to

likely

There is the

Lending

reach the

application

problems are
Supreme Court,"

of the federal Truth in

example the
is the applica

Act to "local" matters, for

private houses. There
private houses, inclu
a landlord's correspond
whether
the
question
ding

renovation of

tion of federal rent control to

ence

lands threatened

purchased

with

a

relationship
merce

...

tenant in another "state" makes their
one

in "interstate commerce"

or

"Com

among the States," and the further ques

ently

considered

only problems

of statutory inter

pretation, without any suggestion that the judgment
of the state court must control the decision of this
question of local land law governed by a constitu
tional state statute. On the question of statutory
interpretation, the United States Supreme Court
decided

in

1805

in

favor of the company and

contrary to the decision of the state court." This
decision prevailed in subsequent motions; and
leaders of the

Philadelphia

Bar advised their

clients,

such correspondence is not only
sufficient but necessary for such a result. As contro

including the land company, that they might safely
rely on it in dealing with the lands which were the

approach such limits, it may prove helpful to
consider carefully Mr. Crosskey's careful and ex
tended argument that the limits of Congressional

subject of controversy.
Thirty-seven years later, in a diversity of citizen
ship case about a negotiable commercial instrument,
the Supreme Court held that the federal courts had
commercial
power to develop their own case law in
cases." But the Court perhaps implied that in most

tion whether if

so

versies

power

are

indeed less than

we

have

come

to

think,

adapted to the needs of a society
where geographical boundaries are less significant
than they were in the days of the Founders.
and

are

better

other

cases

state

law must be followed in the United

implication came to govern the
Courts. As every lawyer knows, it has

States Courts. This

United States

been extended in

2.

Crosskey's views may help
doctrine. In another
define
and
existing
clarify

In these situations Mr.
to

now turn, his
group of situations, to which we
first
at
views are-certainly
glance-remote from

those of the Supreme Court and the
In the 1790s

ating

a

in western

Legal Profession.

Pennsylvania land company oper
Pennsylvania foupd its claim to

applies

in federal

has set in and
scholars

as

our

time,

so

that state law

diversity cases," A slight

won

the

approval

of such

usually

correction

respectable
Judge

Professor Grant Gilmore and

Henry Friendly.f

Crosskey would have us return to the original
Pennsylvania land case. He argues at
length and convincingly that the rule of that case,
Mr.

doctrine of the

5

well

the usage of that day, requires us to
the
common law as one of "the Laws of
recognize
the United States," thereby permitting federal juris
as

6

as

diction of

law

disputes regardless of who
the parties are. It is perhaps too much to expect a
return to the earliest understanding of federal juris
diction. Nevertheless Mr. Crosskey's arguments add
support

common

his view of the extensive powers of
over economic matters.
It is hard to

to

Congress

suppose that Congress could be left without power
to deal with a subject matter, land law or commer

ciallaw, on which a coordinate Court could rule.
The utility if not necessity of legislative power to
define, extend, limit, or change the law developed
by a coordinate court is a persuasive reason for the
familiar relationship in our system between legis
latures and courts.

The

original existence of extensive private law
(and probably criminal law) powers in our United
States Courts suggests, further, that it would not be
revolutionary for us to embark much more exten

sively

than

have done

systematic program
codification, for example, of contract
law, by Act of Congress. To help Congress keep up
with the need for change in everyday law, Congress
might use something like a federal Ministry of
Justice. Reduction in the need for interstate private
conflict of laws (apart from the inevitable jurisdic
tional questions) would alone be worth the energy
and expense involved. The original Constitution has
we

on a

of federal

proved

in this and other ways its

possible

usefulness

in modern times.

Here

we

approach our second subject,

Mr.

Anastaplo

and the First Amendment. A few selected transition

topics

seem

in order.

To his argument about the Commerce Clause
and his argument from the powers of the Court,
Mr.

Crosskey

adds

an

argument from the Preamble

and the General Welfare

Clause,

to

derive

theory
general legislative
Congress, limited of
course by such explicit
provisions as the guarantees
of individual rights in the Constitution and its
of

a

power in

amendments.
The two familiar

objections

to

should first be mentioned. These

theory
theory

such

are

the

of enumerated powers and the
of the Tenth Amendment.

theory
accepted
accepted

a

Mr.

Crosskey has an entirely adequate alternative
explanation for the enumeration of powers of Cong
ress in Article I. In each case there is a
specific and
limited reason for the enumeration, including the
sections dealing with foreign affairs in which
provi
sion is made for giving Congress all or
part of the
powers at the time possessed by the English Crown.
The second objection, from the Tenth Amend
ment, seems adequately answered by the Amend
ment's function in protecting and
"reserving" the
of
states
to
deal
with
power
commerce, by regulation
or taxation, in the absence of inconsistent
legislation
by Congress. The power was not "delegated" in the
sense, familiar at least in the Eighteenth Century,
of being completely given away to Congress, nor
was it
"delegated," in any sense, to the Court.
Answering objections does not of course establish
a case. Mr.
Crosskey's case depends on the implica
tions of the two constitutional references to welfare.

In the Preamble the reference to

3.

These observations

very much condensed
summaries of Mr. Crosskey's two major contribu
are

understanding of our constitutional law
Though we had long discussions of his work as it
progressed, and though he expressed appreciation
of my often contentious contributions, he also
quite
often expressed dissatisfaction with my versions of
tions to

his

an

.

doctrine.24

partly
me,

as

an

I offer these

encouragement

suggestions therefore
to

surprisingly-discouraged

those who are-to
or

confused

by

the

general welfare
apply appropriately to Congress, as the
reference to domestic tranquillity applies to the

seems

to

Executive, and the reference
Mr.

Crosskey

treatment

of

has

a

to

justice,

to the Court.

persuasive argument from the

preambles

in Eighteenth Century
draftsmanship to support the inferences which might
in any event be drawn from the Preamble. In Article

I, the power

promote the general welfare
which
can only be
implies
agency,
Congress, to
use taxes, to finance
regulation or subsidy, for this
to tax to

an

bulk and

purpose.

own

principal argument against the existence of
resulting general legislative power is the insist
ence, in ratification debates, by thoughtful contem
poraries, including members of the Convention,

style of his argument, and partly as my
view of its most important and convincing

portions. On other matters he seems decisively
convincing but not indisputably convincing; on
others, barely convincing; and on a few, mistaken.

The

the

general power; and that
freedom of speech and press, for example, could not
be-limited by the exercise of any powers granted to
that there

Congress.
and adopt

no

was

Nevertheless, the decisions to propose
the First Amendment lend support to the

view that the existence of such

a general power was
perhaps not merely feared but reasonably antici
pated by some discerning contemporaries.

Crosskey's position on this matter is somewhat

Mr.
more

convincing than his position with respect
review of

judicial

to

congressional action. The power
clearly stated or plainly

to review state action is

implied in the Constitution. The power to review
congressional legislation is left to more doubtful
inference, and contemporary state precedents did
not go beyond judicial review of legislation affecting
judicial procedure. Mr. Crosskey argues that review
of congressional action was limited to procedural
questions and
restrict

The

which would usurp

judicial power.
apparently inevitable logic

Madison25is of
seems

action

to

course

to express

an

not

of

or

Marbury

v.

inevitable at all. But it

instinct about

policy

which has

considerable force, and which fits the system of
separation of powers and of checks and balances
which was, and is, the great safeguard of freedom
in theoriginal Constitution. In view of the ambigu

ity of the Constitution on judicial review, consider
ations of policy may well playa part in its interpre
tation. Mr.

Anastaplo,

coming, makes

Crosskey

on

in the book to which

we are

persuasive argument against

a

Mr.

this matter.

The absence of judicial review of critical questions
of war and peace is a reminder of the utility of

judicial

III

such

review in clarification of the Constitution

and in preserving the checks and balances of our
system. The strong reasons, in 1787 and now, for

giving Congress exclusive

power

to

declare

or

1.

shall make

no law
"Congress
abridging the
."
freedom of speech or of the press
in
importance,
Rivalling the Commerce Clause
the principle expressed here is one of humanity as
well as freedom, and an assertion of the important
place occupied by the citizen in considering the
decisions on public affairs which in our society are
ultimately his. He is to have the benefit of all
available views on public matters, expressed in
speech or in the press.
Alexander Meiklejohn developed this position in
...

.

.

his Political Freedom P stating the case for an
interpretation of the First Amendment which under

stands "freedom of

speech"

to

be

unqualified. Such
by the
by Mr.

interpretation has been applied at times
Supreme Court, and supported particularly
an

Justice Black.
George Anastaplo has,
useful
and

developments

some

it

of Mr.

seems

to me, made some

Meiklejohn's doctrines,

persuasive modifications

as

well.

His

book, The Constitutionalist." with what might have
been two separate volumes, one of Appendices and
one

of Notes, rivals Mr.

to American

Crosskey's

as a

contribution

Constitutional Law.

Anastaplo develops Mr. Meiklejohn's doctrine
by analyzing, particularly, the first five words,
." The words could
"Congress shall make no law
hardly be clearer. With some help from illustrations
of parental commands and from familiar transac
tions in everyday life, Mr. Anastaplo shows how
easy it would have been to introduce qualifications,
Mr.

.

such

as

.

which appear in other parts of the
and the Bill of Rights, if they were to

some

Constitution

be understood.
He observes that it is

named. He resists the

only "Congress" that is
attractive tendency to apply

make war, except in a clear emergency, qualify
what was said, earlier in this essay about the absence

the Amendment to the Executive and the Courts,
leaving safeguards against them to other parts of

of

the Constitution. A strict definition of the Executive

"only" in the grants of power to Congress,
including the power to regulate commerce." In
an

matters of

war

and

require an "only,"
contrast

to

peace the

context

seems

limit executive power, in

to the context of the Commerce

which does

need

to

sharp

Clause,
the

implication limiting
powers of states_271t would perhaps be of some use
for the Court at some time to deal explicitly with
this question, for example in developing its Com
merce

not

an

Clause doctrines.

Power combined with

a

proper

regard

for proce

dural due process would, for example, control any
loyalty program which may seem to be needed in
the future.
The meaning of "freedom of speech" is given by
Mr. Anastaplo a more restricted scope than that

given

by Mr. Meiklejohn. By what seems a sound
insight, supported by observations on elec
and legislative, particularly parliamentary,

it

intuitive

toral

7

I
,
i
I

r
I

I

II

I

I
I

I

I
I
IIi

8

precedents, "freedom of speech" is limited to speech
about political matters. These are such matters as are
discussed in considering the election of officials or
proposed amendments to the Constitution. Any
economic proposals, however drastic, are open for
discussion as political matters. On the other hand,
Mr. Anastaplo seems to understand the interests of

Eighteenth Century

American statesmen, in that

obscenity from the scope of the First
Amendment, whatever protection it may be entitled
he excludes

grounds, for example on grounds of
administrative or procedural due process of law.

to

other

on

And he leaves open the more troublesome questions
raised by science, for example Darwin and Freud,
and the old and
At the

same

new

time he

interpretation of the
most

Mr.

Tennessee evolution cases.P?

supports

unqualified

an

First Amendment

against the

troublesome criticism it has received. This is

Crosskey's criticism,

which does

not appear in

his book-where the Amendment receives
attention-but which has been made in
tions and in

little

conversa

teaching.
Crosskey emphasized the
ordinary dictionary meaning of "abridge," which is
not

"limit"

quires

Mr.

or

some

"restrict" but "lessen." "Lessen"

reference to

an

earlier

re

condition, and

the reference which

naturally suggests itself first is
the contemporary law of England. That law pro
hibited only "previous restraints" on speech or
publication, and it is that law which is said to be
crystallized in the First Amendment.
Pursuing the kind of linguistic inquiry whose
Crosskey has shown, Mr. Anastaplo has
found a significant number of Eighteenth Century
texts of quality in which it is said that "natural
rights" must not be, or ought not to be, "abridged"
in the sense of "restricted." Contemporary usage
thus appears to have warranted, though perhaps not
value Mr.

required,

the

the

of "restrict." Our usage today seems, if
less precise.i'The text is at least sufficiently

sense

anything,
flexible
a

so

use

that

a

of

in such

"abridge,"

relatively simple,

relatively refined, meaning

is

as

a

context, in

distinct from

legitimate.

The

refined meaning urged by Mr. Crosskey has been
rejected by the Court, on the ground-among
others-that previous restraints and subsequent

punishments

have much the

same

effects

on

the

Crosskey has used elsewhere with effects
devastating for accepted scholarly doctrines.
Mr.

Mr.

Anastaplo seems
Congress was given

that
ers.

On

seemed

so

at times to

rely on a view
general legislative pow
this point Mr. Cross key's different view has
more persuasive,
though not indisputably
no

so.

Rather

Mr.

unobtrusively,

Anastaplo's interpre

tation of the First Amendment renders unnecessary

extended consideration of the troublesome points
raised by Mr. Meiklejohn and others under the head
of "incitement." It is discussion that is

protected.

Mr.

v.

treatment of

Anastaplos

States32in his

text and in

Schenck

United

indicates

Appendix,
politics normally merges into
incitement, and how calmly the discovery of this
phenomenon should be taken.33 It should not be
an

how discussion in

hard to

distinguish

discussion

with incitement

even

from riots, revolutions and civil wars,

planned,

incipient or in operation.
By way of precaution, it should perhaps be said
that Mr. Anastaplo, like others, recognizes that
what may

seem

"unqualified"
ical

at first to be the

freedom of

common sense

implications

speech require

corrections. Rules of

of

some

an

crit

order, for

meetings, limit-freedom

to interrupt and so destroy
indispensable regulation of streets and
public places is subject only to a requirement that
regulation should not be used to the disadvantage of
particular views. One may protest the uses made of
one's tax money, but one can hardly expect to be
immune to the processes of collection. Hijacking
may be in some cases a revolutionary symbol, but it
is not that alone, and can hardly be privileged. The

debate. The

Hatch Act disabilities of civil servants raise

more

34

troublesome questions.
The protection of discussion has

fraud-except perhaps religious
or on

agreements

on

gossip, all of which
standards and

wages

or

subject
safeguards.
are

or

bearing on
magical fraud
no

prices
to

private
appropriate

or on

other

Finally, it has been observed that Mr. Anastaplo
obscenity from First Amendment protec
tion. He recognizes that the classics present problems
excludes

of classification. But he insists with

the

which flourishes

obscenity
principle

values associated with the words "freedom of speech"

stands is in

and "freedom of the press." Nevertheless, it is
satisfactory to have Mr. Anastaplo's answer to Mr.
Crosskey based on those scholarly methods which

whatever

that in any

event

it

at

least

is not

on

some
so

many book

distinguishable; and
political discussion,

safeguards found elsewhere

tution it may be entitled to.

force that

in the Consti

In

limiting

Congress,

the First Amendment to

apply

it says, and not to the President

as

or

to

the

Court, and
Mr.

only,

to apply-further-to political speech
Anastaplo observes that in making the

Amendment less inclusive
and less

ageable,

one

makes it

be

more man

for

likely
subjected
example
proved the stultifying effects of the
"balancing" metaphors. The limited meaning is
simpler and easier to think of, and is itself persuasive.
to

to

what have

transformation of the scope of the Ffrst Amendment
as that defended
by Mr. Crosskey and the Court
more support than that given by either
Crosskey or the Court. Here Mr. Anastaplo is
legitimately faithful to the historical tests insisted on
by Mr. Crosskey. He emerges, it seems at first sight,

requires
Mr.

as

less of

now

nities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The

Supreme
ment

or

Court has

recognized

enactment of these

a

same

selective reenact

safeguards by

the

Fourteenth Amendment. It may be observed that
most of these safeguards could be derived from
basic doctrines of
Both Mr.

procedural due process.
Crosskey and the Court have urged,

further, that

First Amendment

guaranties, orig

inally applicable only to Congress, were applied to
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr.
Crosskey derives what seems to be not quite convinc
ing support from references to problems of freedom
of speech in pre-Civil War discussions of slavery. He
thinks First Amendment safeguards were included
among the Privileges and Immunities of citizens of
the United States in the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Court, .without serious discussion, incorpo
rated both the religious freedom and the freedom of

speech provisions

of the First Amendment into the

substantive due process which was thought at that
time to be generally provided for in the Fourteenth
Amendment. The reconsideration and eventual dis

approval

of the bulk of substantive due process,

which had been used to control labor and other
economic

legislation,

did not

bring any serious
reconsideration of the religion and speech cases.
Mr. Anastaplo urges persuasively that so great a
I

in

Crosskey

seems

quite

this
or

than

matter

Mr.

the Court.

his position. It

correct in

event, that much of the work
religious and political freedom in the

to me, in any

done

on

be done quite

as well by the
expanding
equal protection and the well estab
lished doctrines of procedural due process as by the
somewhat tortured doctrines of religious freedom
and the relatively emasculated doctrines of freedom
of speech and press at present applied to the states.

states

Anastaplo carries further his effort to isolate
and strengthen the First Amendment by observing
other legitimate limitations of its scope, this time in
its application to the states.
Mr. Crosskey argues convincingly but not perhaps
beyond dispute that, except for the First Amend
ment, the Bill of Rights guaranties (with one possible
minor qualification about appellate practice) ap
plied, in the context of their time, to the states as
well as to the nation. At least as persuasively he
argued that these guaranties were at any rate
applied to the states by the Privileges and Immu
Mr.

Mr.

And yet he
seems

2.

"liberal"

a

Meiklejohn,

can

doctrines of

These matters will be referred

staple's position

is based

on a

to

later. Mr. Ana

liberal

regard

for the

role of the states in maintaining order, subject to a
power of correction by Congress to preserve, but
not to

"abridge,"

freedom of

speech

and of the

press.

Though the differences between Mr. Crosskey
and Mr. Anastaplo on this point have thus far been
emphasized, Mr Crosskey gives Mr. Anastaplo
interesting support in one respect. Mr. Crosskey
argues that if any powers are impliedly excluded
from exercise by Congress under the Constitution,
they are the "police powers" in the limited sense in
which the phrase was used by Eighteenth Century
French and English writers, in contrast to such
larger powers as those to deal with welfare, com
merce
and defense. The police powers are the
powers which we associate with the local police and
fire departments or sometimes the state police.
They are indispensable powers if the states are to
�

govern at all.
Mr.

Anastaplo

reminds

us

of the

guiding signifi

of the constitutional guaranty of a Republican
Form of Government for the states. He explains the

cance

limitation of the

original First Amendment to Con
gress partly by regard for a principle related to the
Republican Form of Government safeguard. Such
disturbances as Shays' Rebellion were what was to
be expected at that time. Like the Whiskey Rebellion
they were expected to be within the physical capa
a

city of

control, just as quite serious riots
handled, in the first instance at least,

states to

today can
by states.

be

9

Republican Form of Government Section
provides for federal intervention to deal with local

have noticed, that the religion and speech
safeguards now in force could well be supported by

insurrections at the

the

The

10

but not

request of the

state

their request. One

governments,

only
put
involving planning the Civil War, or taking the first
steps, as by marching, toward firing on a federal
fort, in which federal intervention would be justified
even against the judgment of a
hesitating state. This
would be in the exercise of a power "necessary and
proper" to preserve the federal government, as
inevitable as a war power to deal with a planned or
executed foreign war.
But otherwise the guaranty of a Republican
at

Form of Government

have at least the

means

can

a case

that the states

speech
tions

their

own

judgments

about

are

to

controlling

and the press, subject to their own constitu
to the traditions of revolutionary freedom

(however

much

disregarded in the
Congress

and to the power of

Tories),
not to "abridge" protections
even

to

of preserving
the prevention of

order. For these purposes, such as
something like a Shays' Rebellion, the states
exercise

are

elementary functions

in the states, in

case

to

treatment
to

extend but

freedom of

of serious

of

excesses

speech
of state

control.
In view of the

accepted religious powers of the
states, and the political considerations suggested
here, it is possible to understand why the First
Amendment applied only to Congress. And it is
difficult to think that a policy, however changing,
expressed so clearly in the original Amendment,
could have been understood to be reversed by the
general words of the Fourteenth Amendment, even
in the context of their time.

To these historical considerations Mr.

Anastaplo
practical arguments drawn from the advan
tages of preserving the elementary functions of the
states, and again from avoiding the strains inci
dental to expanding the scope of the First Amend
ment which threaten the purity of its application to
its expressed object, the Congress.
adds

3.
As I understand it, Mr.

Anastaplo

is content to

as

we

Equal Protection Clause or, as
obscenity (or as in Mr. Anastaplo's
case), by procedural due process.

in the
own

case

of

splendid

originating in a Catholic or Protestant
source may well, in context, be objectionable to one
group of churches or the other, as well as to Jews
and Humanists, who are entitled to equal treatment
in tax supported institutions." Financial aid to
A prayer

private schools,

as

well

as

and universities,

colleges

from state or nation, requires controls in the interests
of quality and racial justice, but not, it seems today,
in the interests of

religious neutrality; but this is a
long story."
Aristophanes, Rabelais or
Freud is for all legitimate purposes like an interest
in any other literary or scientific master, and the
difficulty of defining "hard core" pornography, as
An interest in

well

as

the obstacles to unselective

prosecution, may
print

well give effective constitutional protection to
ed matter generally.
Past

(or

even

present) membership

with know

ledge and support of purposes, in far left or right
wing revolutionary organizations seems an inadmiss
able basis for

classifying bar admission applicants.
legitimate objection to the New York
bar admission procedure recently approved by the
Supreme Court, over dissents which might well be
37
supported on equa I protection groun d s.
It is to be noticed also that the implications of the
Constitution may change with changing times. The
Bill of Rights amendments concerned primarily
with procedure may develop new meanings under
the influence of equal protection standards and
refinements by Justices who are particularly expert
in matters of procedure, and with changing circum
This

seems a

.

Their words

stances.

evaluative

well

are

in

some

cases,

at

least,

descriptive. "Due" is evaluative,
"process" descriptive. As wardens know, if police
men do not, capital punishment is cruel. It would
not have been unusual in the Seventeenth Century,
when public drawing and quartering were familiar,
but today it is unusual in expressing and stimulating
extreme sadomasochistic impluses. It has become
as

as

unusual in still another respect in recent years in
being rarely carried out. It is most frequently

leave his argument at about the point where I have
attempted thus far to state it. To anyone alarmed

ordered

by the resulting prospect of a possible loss of liberal
safeguards against the states, it should be observed,

ments in

though
in this

against the poor and members of minorities;
altogether unique among punish

it is not

this respect, its

respect uniquely

savagery makes it
objectionable." Its abolition

peculiar

should be added

to

all the

improvements made by

the Warren Court in criminal
Mr.

in which

procedure,

Justice Black generally concurred, though

mod

ification-as distinct from refinement-of Fourth
Amendment meanings called for one of his warnings
that the Court is not "a

...

constitutional

conven

tion."'39
me

important. They comfort

about the preservation of libertarian safeguards
against the states. At the same time they remind us
us

again of the significance of the Republican
Government guaranty.

That is

safeguard or a warning against
developments of federal judicial

Form of

significant

as

a

the most extreme

powers in consti
tutional matters, and against related developments
of the powers of Congress to implement the Four

teenth Amendment. Such

developments might ac
questionable change in
the federal system than anything likely to occur soon
under the influence of Mr. Crosskey's views of the
economic powers of Congress and of the General
complish a greater

and

more

Welfare Clauses of the Constitution.
States'

Anastaplo's

Rights

Crosskey

in conversation and

against letting

velop

the

the

generality

Equal

teaching used

to

warn

Protection Clause de

and

undependability of the old
substantive due process. He would have confined
the Clause to racial matters and to the
carpetbaggers'

abuse of granting legislative monopolies to named
persons, and he would have limited "protection" to
law types of criminal and civil responsi
bilities, including perhaps common law "public util
common

ity" responsibilities,
It

seems to me

but not

public education.
equal protection
desegregation and voting

that the results of

decisions, including the
decisions, have thus far been

constructive

and

linguistically defensible.

The Connecticut birth con
trol decision may best be explained by the
inequal
ities of selective
enforcement inherent in the punish
ment of birth control itself and in the bizarre

types

of

is a part of substantive or proce
dural due process which is applicable to
Congress,
and a ground, though unmentioned by the Court,
for the District of Columbia school

desegregation

investigation, hardly

consistent with

procedural

due process, which would be necessary for
general
enforcement." The discovery of a constitutional

protection for

union members' and union

lawyers'

consultations about members' problems may argu
ably be justified on grounds of an extended equal

protection,

or on

grounds

of the

Or

"state"

the District of Columbia is
to be dealt with by analogy to states.

perhaps

or

a

We should remember here that the

Equal Protec
Clause, thus treated, has critical philosophical
implications. The Golden Rule, the Categorical
Imperative, and Utilitarian doctrine exhibit the
necessity of using the idea of equality in practical
tion

including lawmaking, however difficult its
application may be. The idea is not inconsistent, as
Aristotle and Thomas Jefferson will remind us, with
an
internally consistent scheme of differential econ
matters,

omic returns. But

experience with the old substan

tive due process,
more

developed generally from even
speculative ideas of liberty and property,

reminds

also that law is not identical with

us

equity.

instincts and Mr.

'Crosskey's Federalist instincts at this point reinforce
one
another. Taking a larger and more general view
of constitutional history than he sometimes did, Mr.
us

legal advice on civil and criminal
perhaps barely arguable that

alike." It is

equal protection

case.

These points seem to

Mr.

dural features of
matters

important

proce-

The illustrations which follow of both the
and the

dangers

matters will

of

serve

equal protection
as

a

uses

in economic

final' warning that Mr.

Crosskey's disposition to confine the principle strictly
to racial matters and
grants of private monopoly
has a thoughtful philosophical basis, too.
The Equal Protection Clause has useful and per
haps growing applications to taxation." If "subsidy"
can be
adequately defined, or only its cruder forms
considered, equal protection might prove not only a
safeguard against "discrimination" immediately un
favorable to nonresidents. It might prove also a
limit on discrimination immediately favorable to
nonresidents, but ultimately unfavorable to resi
dents and nonresidents alike.43 An example is the
great range of
ments to

tax

benefits,

"industrial

from differential

revenue

assess

bond" exemptions,

used to attract and

in

sites for

other activ

please corporations
manufacturing and perhaps for

selecting

ities.

Economic

found,

as a

policy

has

perhaps

result of

our

experience with substantive

due process,

ment,

state

a
or

treatment. An

in any event been

fit for legislative treat
both, than for judicial
ironical example may be suggested.

subject

more

national

or

An effective minimum wage, like an effective union
scale, tends to be immediately advantageous to the

relatively employable

and

immediately

disadvan-

11

relatively unemployable, and hence
the relatively poor. The case for collectively set
wage scales depends on long-run problematical
tageous

12

to

social considerations. It is doubtful whether

a

deci

constitutional doc

sion is to be

expected returning
invalidating state minimum
wage laws, this time on equal protection grounds.
The equalization of women's opportunity for over
trine to the 1920s and

time work and wages and the removal of unions'
remaining exemptions from antitrust laws may be

spirit of the coming times,

in the

required by

the

Equal

even

if

they

are

not

Protection Clause.

fascinating problem of straightforward and
serious inequality combined with troublesome prob
lems of taxation is presented by the public
school equal expenditure cases. Here the Supreme
Court has been faced with the application of coun
sels of justice on the one side and of judicial caution
and the appropriate sphere of state policy on the
A

My unrealized expectation was a decision
extending the scope of equal protection and limiting,
however cautiously, the scope of state determin
other.

ations. There is

a

curious contrast between the two

decided since this paper

cases

was

prepared,

in the

recognition of a right of privacy in the abortion case,
and the inability to recognize a right to equal

expenditures
case.

on

public education in this

more

recent

On the other hand in the latter case, there is

rational reluctance to interfere with state

determinations, particularly in
matter

of taxation.

a

a

policy

somewhat intricate

44

development of equal protection as a safe
for
religious and civil liberties generally, and
guard
for civil rights, will doubtless be limited by a
caution derived from considering the consequences
of applying formulations in such cases to the some
what different controversies and complexities of
economics. Mr. Anastaplo and Mr. Crosskey com
bine to emphasize the importance of such caution
on
general principles. Considerations of States'
Rights and of the appropriate scope of Legislative
and Congressional powers alike will indicate the
continuing need for a degree of judicial self-restraint.
Mr. Justice Black's two warnings that the Supreme
Court is not
our

a

constitutional convention will rein

sense

of the limitations of

1.
Mr.

judicial

pro

ceedings as means of deciding great social, economic,
and political issues, and of the limitations of even
the greatest Justices as well.

served

Meiklejohn

from 1913 until he

was

The removal

1923.

as

President of Amherst

removed

was

itself

by
a

the Trustees in
free

drama in

speech, with the opposition to Mr. Meiklejohn led
by such middle income reactionary Amherst grad
Coolidge, and with Mr. Meiklejohn
supported until the end by at least one high income
conservative Trustee, Dwight Morrow, a Morgan
partner. I studied under Mr. Meiklejohn at Amherst
and later taught in his Experimental College at
Wisconsin, where we had the first-s-and best-col
lege house plan in this country. Mr. Meiklejohn
moved later to Berkeley where he became more and
more active in advising young lawyers and their
clients about the free speech issues which had been,
throughout his teaching, major subjects of his inter
uates

as

est. He

Calvin

was

relied on-it

seems

fair to say-more

else, by Mr. Justice Black in his
and
expression of a theory of an
development
When the New York
Amendment.
unqualified First

than anyone

Times libel

before Mr.
that it

was

case

was

decided in 1964, not

Meiklejohn's death, he said to
"an occasion for dancing in the

a

long

friend

streets."

Meiklejohn was rightly happy about what
was partly his own victory. His influence on Mr.
Justic Black, and on the Court, was symbolized at
the Washington memorial service, attended by Mr.
Anastaplo, for Mr. Meiklejohn. Mr. Justice Black
Mr.

left

The

force

IV

the

his

a

Court, for the first time in
he told the assembly-to speak at the

conference of the

career-as

related sequence, the daughter and son
Anastaplo, who is in many ways a reincar

service. In

of Mr.
nation

a

of Mr.

Meiklejohn,

were

stirred

at

the

Justice Black,
Washington
in their
dissent
conclusion
of
his
the
by hearing
funeral service for Mr.

father's
Mr.

case

Justice

read first in

a

Black's opinions.

series of excerpts from
45

relationship between the University of Chi
sensible consti
cago and the development of a
tutional theory since the Second World War is
indicated by what may be more than a coincidence.
Mr. Meiklejohn gave at the University his celebrated
lectures on freedom of speech, to an audience which
included Mr. Anastaplo, just before Mr. Anastaplo
himself became a student of Mr. Crosskey. The cause
of freedom was being advanced in other ways as well
by the University economists.
The

2.

Mr.

Meiklejohn

once

sions of the

said, rather proudly

it

picketing

seemed to me, that no student of his had ever
agreed with him. It is at any rate not surprising that
his thought seems both to have started much of the

was on

development described

both

which

danger" qualification, going

even

1930s,

back to the 1920s and

important feature of

with critical attacks

on

period

rich

accepted constitutional

doc

a

trine. His criticism did not affect the law until the

late 1950s. But it has

rethinking
He

been

always

stimulus

a

to

the Constitution.

deplored

own

my

disposition, expressed

in

meanings cannot be discovered, to simple layman's
meanings. I justified my position then, as I would

today, on the ground that it is the best approach to
keeping judges under some control, to prevent what
might politely be called their rhetorical skill from
turning

court into

a

But Mr.

Meiklejohn

lawyers

and their

"constitutional convention."

a

had

more

reasoning.

confidence than I in

He

was

ready

to trust

himself and them to remake the Constitution, or at
least 'its broadly generalized portions, to suit the
times.
was

in

opposition
hand, he

to

methods. On the other

Mr.

Crosskey's

was-I think-in

basic agreement with Mr.
power. Walton Hamilton

Crosskey's view of federal
taught at Amherst in my
in
a
book
day. Later,
warmly expressing his debt to
Mr. Meiklejohn, he anticipated a
part of Mr.
Crosskey's discussion of the Eighteenth Century
meaning of "commerce," and came to conclusions
anticipating Mr. Crosskey's conclusions about the
scope of congressional power to regulate "Com
...

part of

a

among the several States. '�6 This

constitutional reform

succeed to

was

movement that did

extent, beginning in 1937, with the
of
the old sugar refining and child
discrediting
labor cases, and a related' Due Process and Com
merce Clause case
limiting the power of Congress to
some

protect labor organizations,
And
was

in

not

yet-returning
doctrinaire. I

in his Free

Speech

a

even on

the

to unions-Mr.

once

urged him

to

railroads,"

there

of

one case

job

for

case

the

bringing

the attention of

in the other

was

that in

ground
means

the

a

local

picketing

government.r"

a

in his view

In

"public speech,"

entitled to First Amendment protection,
against the states. He was ready to consider
was

possibility,

at any

rate, that

ordinary picketing

private wage dispute otherwise known to the
public was entitled only to the protection given
price agreements generally. This would include
a

activity

process" protection

to

which all human

is entitled.

It will be

that Mr.

Meiklejohn's approach
Anastaplo's thinking, but not
controlled it. Mr. Meiklejohn's "public speech" has
a larger scope than Mr.
Anastaplo's "political speech:'
I think Mr. Meiklejohn would have had no
difficulty
seen

has influenced Mr.

about Darwin and

Freud, and in his later years he
was,
him, disposed to extend First
Amendment protection at least to allegedly porno
as

I understand

graphic classics. Nor did he have any difficulty
applying First Amendment limitations to the

about

states.

Mr.
a

Here he

merce

the

to

construction

cases

that "due

this essay, to give-great significance to historical
meanings of constitutional texts and, where such

only

grievances
community, and that
a

the

on

the

workers'

here and to oppose some of
it. His criticism of the First Amedment
"present
was an

1930s,

was

Meiklejohn

test of

the

outer

about which

happy

ready

to

use

limits of free

"incitement"

speech,

a

as

matter

used to engage in some of those
arguments that were characteristic of our

relationship.
in

was

we

I used to insist that "incitement" would

time of stress revive the

"present danger" quali
language "planning" or
"commanding" violence may raise elementary prob
a

fication. On the other hand

lems about the order which any state must
by its
nature maintain. (But an idle dream is not a

"conspiracy," whether to corner a market or to
overthrow the ·government.) On this point, as I
have indicated, I am happy to find that Mr.
Anastaplo has found a legitimate way of avoiding
what in this case seems an unproductive linguistic
discussion.

Philosophically,

Mr.

Meiklejohn

was

convinced

that freedom of communication may be
preserved
in communities where, in the interests of
public

Meiklejohn

welfare,

incorporate

stricted. This position disposed him to accept in
general the conclusions of both Mr. Anastaplo and

distinction which I think it fair

to say he was at least
ready to consider approving in
conversation. He defended the first picketing deci-

Mr.

economic liberties

Crosskey,

if

not

the Constitution. Mr.

are

their way of

Anastaplo

considerably

re

reasoning, about

is somewhat appre-

13

hensive about any concentration of ecorromic as
as political power .49 Mr. Crosskey was, despite

well
14

his opinions

syndicalist

on

or

federal power, definitely opposed to
"central" planning, as well as to

socialism. He started his book

support for

as

a

hoped for improvement in captial markets by the
Securities and Exchange legislation of the 1930s,
and its optimistically awaited implementation. He
said that he left Wall Street

admired)

(where

in the 1930s because he

he

was

much

was

"the

only

there with any respect f.or private property."
He was, like me, neither a Pelagian nor a Jansenist;
man

but, like

me, he had

healthy Eighteenth Century
regard for the limitations of the human being,
including the human being in power. While history
as usual is ambiguous, economic liberty seems to
me, in experience and in principle, a necessary and
probably in the long run a sufficient condition of
a

freedom in communication.
In this view there is

great merit in the simple and

flexible, but disciplined,

Constitution for

which

and Mr.

Meiklejohn
have worked. Whatever our economic policies,
liberal or collectivist, they will increasingly require
self-consistent national implementation; and they
will increasingly require the fullest possible discus
sion of even the most drastic and unlikely appearing

Mr.

Crosskey,

Mr.

Anastaplo,

suggestions.

"negative income 'tax'," which
discussed, off and on, since 1926. It
will be noticed that any family income plan based
on allowances given by the United States depends
on the spending powers of Congress. In view of the
traditional concern over the regulatory powers of
Congress, it is ironical that its spending powers
have seldom been questioned. Even state spending
has received little if any effective check. It is only in
the case of the first Agricultural Adjustment Act
that federal spending has been impeded by the
Supreme Court�O State and federal welfare spending
will be increasingly in need of coordination. Com
prehensive schemes of regulation, for example wage
and hour regulation, may need to be coordinated
with welfare programs. bo wage and price controls
lessen or increase poverty? If they do neither, are
they useful for other purposes? Poverty and unem
ployment seem, on questionable grounds, to affect
decisions on military spending and hence on strategic
policy.
An

example

I have heard

is the

problems of poverty and of war and peace
require national solutions reached with the most
complete freedom of discussion that can be obtained.
The

V

Anastaplo's and Mr. Cross
Meiklejohn's,
constitutional
opinions not only stand the
key's
tests of practical utility. When slight adjustments
are made among them, their Constitution has the
immediate intuitive appeal charactertistic of music
Mr.

Mr.

poetry.

or

In the Notes which

are

in effect the third volume

Anastaplo's Constitutionalist, the author
engages in brilliant and delightful comments and
explorations, which can be read with the main text
or with the aid of the Index, but which are best read
in Mr.

at

leisure

their

on

own

account,"

example, fairly early in the Notes, the
Constitution is compared with the famous cup of
tea which brought to life in Proust's mind the
beloved and beautiful Combray with its people, its
fields and its buildings. And at the very end of the
Notes, Mr. Anastaplo reverts to his early love for
Here, for

and skill in

mathematics,

with

I understand it-has received

a

passage which-as

(for

its

mathematics)

by qualified specialists.f It is in part
beyond the comprehension of a layman. But it is
also in part intelligible to any student of philosophy
who is aware of the part played by Pythagorean
thinking in the history of both Greek and modern
philosophy. Here the extraordinary mathematical
relations among the elements are taken as signs of a
deep if inscrutable reason in the nature of things,
including the nature of law.
confirmation

1

This essay includes observations which have been stimu

lated, or originally made, by a great number of unnamed
students, teachers and colleagues. The person who should
be selected for special mention here is Harry Kalven, whose
influence is most readily identifiable among all those going
back to the earliest days of someone born in Madison and
largely reared in academic communities. Mr. Kalven's con
versation and writing have been exceptionally useful with
respect to the subjects discussed in this essay. My own view
is that his general ideas can be expressed in the language
used here, and that his principles will often if not generally
lead to results like those reached by means of the principles
stated here. The statements of the three principal authors
considered in this essay have some advantages in persuasive
ness, accuracy and clarification, along with some disadvan
tages, no doubt, in unfamiliarity of approach. Mr. Kalven
will perhaps not object if I express a hope that his new book
will be published before too long. I am sure it will join the
recent classics

here under discussion.

Another colleague, Philip B. Kurland, has written a survey,
perhaps somewhat comparable to the present essay, express
ing views different from those developed here, particularly
his views about equality and about the Warren Court. See
Kurland, Politics, the Constitution and the Warren Court
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). But see note
35, infra.
Clues to my early studies and reflections on subjects men
tioned

or

discussed here will be found in:

"Movement in

Supreme Court Adjudication," 46 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 366381; 593, 593-604; 795, 809-811 (1933); "The Classical
American Doctrine of 'The Separation of Powers,'" 2 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 385 (1935); Social Change and Labor Law,
Part I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939) (Charles
O. Gregory, co-author).
Previous discussion by me of Mr. Crosskey's views, in
various aspects, appeared in "The Old Constitution," 20 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 529 (1953); Book Review, 54 Colum. L. Rev.
439 (1954); "The Master," 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 238 (1968).
Unpublished correspondence with the Journal of Legal Edu
cation dealing with details of the major criticisms of Mr.
Crosskey's book is available from me for anyone interested.
The correspondence was incidental to a badly mistaken
reference to my Columbia Law, Review contribution in the
first edition of the American Law School Association's read
ings on professional responsibility.
See also "Reflections on Conscientious Objection to War,"
25 National Lawyers Guild Practitioner 115 (1966). And see

the bibliography prepared by Law Review editors, 30 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 221, 223-224, 226, 227.
This paper began as a deliberately noteless and corres
pondingly readable essay. In the course of discussing specific
obscurities and objections, notes have been regretfully added.
It must be obvious that they are selective. They do not pre
tend to deal with all obscurities or objections. Citations are
limited to easy aids and to cases of special interest. Lower
court and state court citations particularly make no pretense
of completeness, and much the same thing is true of United
States Supreme Court decisions.
2

to

Mr.

See Alexander

Meiklejohn,

Self-Government (New
Meiklejohn's position

mented by
lected and

"

...

(1967).
In his

Appendices, in effect the second of three volumes
Constitutionalist, Mr. Anastaplo includes, with other
interesting materials, selected materials on his bar admission
case. In re George
Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961). That case
still seems to me an outstanding contribution to legal edu
cation. The briefs in that case, prepared by him as counsel
pro se, merit particular attention as do the dissenting opin
The

in

ions of Mr. Justice Bristow in the Supreme Court of Illinois
and of Mr. Justice Black in the Supreme Court of the United

States.

Professor C. Herman Pritchett, in

a recent review (60
[1972]), expresses his admiration for
The Constitutionalist, and recognizes its relationship to the

in Free

L.

Calif.

Rev.

1476

studies of Mr.

Crosskey.
huge book is primarily a treatise on the first
amendment, with notes. As such it is probably the most
original, extended, learned, dogmatic, tightly-structured,
eloquent, unorthodox, and altogether heroic essay in
constitutional explanation, interpretation, and plain and
fancy assertion since the two volume blockbuster of
William W. Crosskey, who incidentally was one of
Anastaplo's professors at the University of Chicago
This

Free

York:

Speech and Its Relation
Harper & Bros., 1948).
Speech has been supple

number of other papers which have been col
reprinted with the second edition of the Free
Speech book, all under the title, Political Freedom: The
Constitutional Powers of the People (New York: Harper &
Bros., 1960). See also his articles: "The Legal Status of Our
Freedom," 20 Lawyers Guild Rev. 106 (1960); "The First
Amendment is an Absolute," 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245 (1961);
"The Balancing of Self-Preservation Against Political Free
dom," 49 Calif. L. Rev. 4 (1961). And see note 35, infra.

Law School.

a

3
See George Anastaplo, The Constitutionalist: Notes on
the First Amendment (Dallas: Southern Methodist Univer
sity Press, 1971). Mr. Anastaplo's position in The Constitu
tionalist has been supplemented by "Obscenity and Common
Sense: Toward a Definition of 'Community' and 'Individu
ality,'" in Robert E. Meagher, ed., Toothing Stones: Re
thinking the Political (Chicago: Swallow Press, 1972) (re
printed, with several additions, in 16 St. Louis U. L. J. 527
[1972]); "Preliminary Reflections on the Pentagon Papers,"

Chi. Magazine (Jan.IFeb., 1972) 2, "The
Papers and the Rule of 'No Prior Restraints,'"
U.

Mr. Anastaplo's contributions to legal and political
phi
losophy appear in his other papers, including his article on
Plato's Apology of Socrates in Ancients and Moderns: Essays
on the Tradition
of Political Philosophy in Honor of Leo
Strauss, ed. Joseph Cropsey (New York: Basic Books, 1964),
and his two articles in the Wisc. L. Rev.: "Natural Right
and the American Lawyer," 1965 Wisc. L. Rev. 322 (1965),
"Law and Morality; On Lord Devlin, Plato's Meno and
Jacob Klein," 1967 Wisc. L. Rev. 231 (1967). See also note
49, infra.
His Apology article was commented on by Willmoore Ken
dall, the conservative political scientist, in his review of
Ancients and Moderns, where he speaks of "the touching
essay on Plato's Apology by George Anastaplo (himself the
author of perhaps the only 'apology' of our time that de
mands a place in any anthology of American oratory); it is
hardly too much to say that Anastaplo gives us a wholly
new Apology
61 American Political Science Rev. 783

Pentagon
U.

Chi.

Magazine (Marchi April, 1972) 16 (both Pentagon Papers
articles have been reprinted in 118 Cong. Rec. S11560 [July
24, .1972]); "Vietnam, Insubordination and Self-govern
ment," Chicago Tribune, June 25, 1972, sec. lA, p. 1 (re
printed in 118 Congo Rec. E8414 [Oct. 5, 1972], E8480
[Oct. 10, 1972]).

4
William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in
the History of the United States (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1953). Mr. Crosskey's position in Politics and
the Constitution has been supplemented by "Charles Fair
man, 'Legislative History,' and the Constitutional Limita
tions on State Authority," 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1954); "John
Marshall and the Constitution," 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 377
(1956) (reprinted in Mr. Justice, ed. Allison Dunham and
Philip B. Kurland, [Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1964]).
See,

Mr. Crosskey, the Memorial Issue, 35
(1968). See also note 1, supra.

on

Rev. 229

U. Chi. L.

Mr. Meiklejohn's book can be used without an index.
Crosskey's and Mr. Anastaplo's books are well indexed.

5

For

some

Mr.

purposes it would be desirable to start with

Mr.

Anastaplo and Mr. Meiklejohn. Mr. Anastaplo's book,
dealing with material with which both he and Mr. Meikle
john are concerned, is new. Its discussion will lead to my
expression of some views about equality. In the end, equality
and freedom are perhaps more important, more general,
topics than power to regulate commerce.
One theme on which Mr. Crosskey, Mr. Anastaplo and I
are

in

agreement is the

treatment of the Constitution.

Mr.

15

16

Crosskey, the most uncompromising of us all, is .opposed to
the rhetorical manipulation of the Constitution which has
appeared throughout its history. Mr. Meiklejohn does not
than we to have
agree with us. He would be more disposed
judicial policy prevail in conflicts with text.
The historical approach to the Constitution in which I
claim to share applies to the whole instrument. It seems to
me indispensable to describe that approach at the beginning
and then move to the topics which are perhaps now more
controversial, and which are illuminated by Mr. Anastaplo's
brilliant book. Among other things, this beginning will sup
ply materials for those, perhaps including Mr. Anastaplo,
who will wish to complain that my own treatment of Consti
tutional freedoms and equalities is inconsistent with the
historical criteria with which I begin.
6

Note

4,

supra.

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 520 (1965); Katz
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364-74, particularly 373-74
(1967). The common theme in both cases was, in Mr. Justice
Black's view, the creation of a constitutional right of privacy.
Compare the discussion in the text at notes 39-41, infra.
7

v.

An address in Elmira, New York, May 3, 1970, quoted
President Roosevelt, March 9, 1937. See George Seldes,
The Great Quotations, 335 (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1966).

1015 WalL 232 (U.S., 1873). See note 43, infra. Mr.
Crosskey, and others, attribute the 1873 development to such
cases as Gibbons v. Ogden (9 Wheat. 1 [U.S., 1824]) and to
the anti-federalist influence of pre-civil war days. My own
view is that the judicial statements to this effect before the
Civil War are few in number, dicta in the simplest sense of
the word, and cautious. They are inconsistent with what hap
pened to the bankruptcy power in litigation which had con
siderable political interest. The relation between substantive
due process and the negative implications of the Commerce
Clause is illustrated by the protections developed for insur
ance, which was not even "commerce," beginning with All
geyer v. Louisiana 165 U.S. 578 (1897), and proceeding to a
scheme with remarkable resemblance to that developed for

occupations which were "commerce" and "interstate." The
whole scheme of protections was an appropriate mark of that
era, foreseen by Tocqueville, when the freedom of the great
and powerful, if not the aristocrats, was to have its last day,
before it lost its vitality and

was

succeeded

See my "Movement in

perhaps authority.
Adjudication," op.

cit. supra, note

this matter which I have

by equality and
Supreme Court

1, with conclusions

seen no reason

to

change

on

since 1933.

8

11

See notes

12

United States

13

Hammer

v.

Dagenhart,

14

Wickard

v.

Filburn, 317

15

United States

16

Maryland v. Wirtz,

17

Katzenbach

18

Perez

by

Compare: "What's the Constitution between friends?" At
tributed to "Timothy J. Campbell, about 1885, to President
Cleveland who refused to sign a bill on the grounds it was
unconstitutionaL Campbell was a Tammany member of the
House of Representatives, and the attribution to him is on
the authority of William Tyler Page." Burton Stevenson,
The Home Book of Quotations, 307 (New York: Dodd,

Mead & Co., 1964).
Politics and the Constitution, 1278. Mr. Crosskey did
not use the boll weevil illustration in his book. It might have
appeared among the illustrations on pages 53-54, except for
the view that states' territories are no more "discrete" than

14-18, infra.
v.

v.

v.

E. C.

Knight Co., 156 U.S.

Darby,

247 U.S. 251
U.S. III

McClung,

(1895).

(1918).

(1942).

312 U.S. 100

392 U.S. 183

1

(19.41).

(1968).

379 U.S. 294

(1964).

9

lots"; or on page 76. Mr. Crosskey was intent on
relating "among" to "states" as collective units. He was more
skeptical about his view of the meaning of "states" than he
needed to be. Anyone whose views are affected by life "in"
an incompletely urbanized "state," like New Mexico, will
"vacant

realize to what an extent one uses the word "state" to refer
to the community and not to the territory.
One may recognize that it would be "ludicrous" today to
speak of activity "among" a level plain; but it does not seem
to me inappropriate to speak of boys playing baseball among
"vacant" or "back" lots; and state boundaries create in our
minds, it seems to me, a sense of discreteness like that
"among" islands or mountains. When one adds the common
as communities Mr. Crosskey's argument,
use of "states"
based on an overwhelming number of instances of "among"
with groups of people, seems unanswerable. His fastidious

dependence on these latter instances seems to me, as I go
back to them, to have limited the force of his argument for
the contemporary reader. "Among" includes but is not lim
ited to "between" even in its' application to more than two
territorial units, including the territories of states; and even
more clearly,
perhaps, in its application-of which Mr.
Crosskey has such a wealth of examples-to more than two
communities.

This note is meant particularly for readers, of whom I hope
there will be a number, who will be encouraged to go back to
the book itself and compare it with my treatment of its mean
ing and implications.

v.

United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).

Lest it be supposed that all such questions are "settled,"
should recall the questions raised by the application of
statutes with "among" tests but limited by interpretation to
"interstate" commerce, such as the Labor Standards Act and
the Sherman Act, when labor conditions or monopolies in the
construction industry are under consideration. The Labor
Standards Act leaves things somewhat unpredictable. See
48 Am. Jr. 2d. "Labor," § 1593. Unions seem to be more
19

one

vulnerable, so far as the "commerce" criterion is in question,
than do employing contractors under the Sherman Act. Com
U.S. 64
pare Industrial Ass'n of San Francisco v. U. S., 268
(1925) with Allen Bradley Co. v. Union, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
Unpredictable questions about the Truth in Lending Act,
which has no "interstate" language, and which seems meant
to depend on monetary powers, and about rent controls,
which has no "interstate" language either, have arisen re
cently in Albuquerque (along with a federal gun control case
under a statute properly given an "interstate" interpretation
by the Supreme Court [United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336
[1971]). The truth in lending case was settled favorably to
the client, but probably less favorably than it would have
been but for the probable necessity for and the chances on
taking it to the Supreme Court. When last I knew the rent
control case was still in litigation.
The recent federal act applicable to bombings creates here
the traditional "interstate" classifications which may
the detached lay observer somewhat bizarre.
20

Huidekoper's

Lessee

v.

Douglass,

3 Cr. 1

seem

(U.S., 1805).

to

21

Swift

22

Erie R. R. Co.

73

v.

Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (U.S., 1842).

Tompkins,

v.

304 U.S. 64

uary 27-28, 1973, dealing with the Rosenberg Case, in the
time of the Korean War. Among other things the case illus
trates the

(1938).

See

Henry J. Friendly, "In Praise of Erie-and of the
New Federal Common Law," 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383 (1964)
(reprinted-with intervening cases-in Friendly, Benchmarks,
155 [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967]); Grant
Cilmore, 1 Security Interests in Personal Property § 8.3; 2 id.
§ 45.2 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965); Gihnore, "On Statutory
Obsolescence," 39 U. Colo. L. Rev. 461, 475-76 (1967)

Invitation to
&

Compare Prigg

1803).

28

Note 2, supra.

29

Note 3, supra.

v.

Pennsylvania,

16 Pet. 539

39

Katz

40

Griswold

Texas

(U.S., 1842).

See Harry Kalven, "A Commemorative Case Note: Scopes
State," 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 505 (1960); Epperson v. Ar
kansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).

(1919).
.

33

Ther� is

a

v.

United States, supra,
v.

Connecticut,

reproduction

in the

Appendix of the pamphlet

which led to the conviction of the defendants in the Schenck
case and to the affirmation of the judgment of conviction
by
Mr. Justice Holmes on behalf of his associates.

seems

to

See the decision

ruling

a

provision of the Hatch Act

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (by Mr. Justice
Black). See Philip B. Kurland, Religion and the Law Of
Church and State and the Supreme Court (Chicago: Aldine
Publishing Co., 1962). Compare Alexander Meiklejohn, "Edu
cational Cooperation Between Church and State," 14 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 61 (1949).
36
In view of a persuasive but at present ineffectual case for
the position that equal protection requires contributions to
parochial schools, it is possible to think that cases limiting
such contributions will be reconsidered. Brusca v. State of
Missouri ex rel State Board of Education, 332 F. Supp. 275
(three-judge court, E.D. Mo., 1971), aff'd 405 U.S. 1050
(1972). But see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)

(inclusion of salary payments; state legislation) Compare
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (buildings; federal
legislation). See also note 44, infra.
Law Students Research Council
See note 45, infra.

v.

Wadmond,

401 U.S.

(1971).

38

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See my review
of Louis Nizer, The Implosion Conspiracy (New York: Dou

bleday

&

Co., 1973)

This factor would have

own protection or on procedural grounds, are
special warn
ings against expanding the Ninth Amendment. See Ana
staplo, The Constitutionalist, supra note 3, pp. 25, 432-433.
The Ninth Amendment seems, however, a more straightforward basis for the result in Roe v. Wade (the case from

Texas) than is "the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of per
liberty and restrictions upon state action" which Mr.
Justice Blackmun, speaking for the majority, says "we feel"
to be the source of "the right of privacy." He includes the
sonal

as

an

alternative

41

in

Chicago Daily

News

source.

Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen

Virginia State Bar, 377

U.S. 1

42

35

37

(Mr. Justice Black

un

constitutional. National Association of Letter Carriers v. U.S.
Civil Service Commission, 346 F. Supp. 578 (three-judge
court, Dist. Col. 1972), appealed 41 L.W. 3241 (1972).

154

7.

supra, note 7

have been another.

Ninth Amendment
34

note

a limitation on the
application of the Bill of Rights to the
states, and the questionable historical basis for the Supreme
Court's power to disregard acts of Congress except for its

See the discussion in the text at notes 9 and 11, supra.

32249 U.S. 47

Inquest (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday

enforceable in any court. It is hard to suppose that the
Amendment was to be understood as meant to expand the
power of the Supreme Court to create substantive constitu
tional law governing either the states or Congress, free from
anything but debatable philosophical guidance. What proved

30

31

an

justified a decision based on the principle expressed in the
Equal Protection Clause.
Privacy may be included in the Ninth Amendment, but a
more likely explanation of that Amendment is that it was
and is to be understood as applying to philosophical "rights."
The simplest example is the "right" of revolution, clearly not

v.

s=s==e=e=eeeeeeeee

my

Compare, however, Roe v. Wade, 41 L. W. 4213 (Jan. 22,
1973). A recognized factor in the situation is the difficulty of
the relatively poor and the facility of the relatively prosperous
in getting abortions, particularly safe abortions, in a number
of jurisdictions, at least. Illinois is one such jurisdiction, and

26 The
absence of "only" is a strong reason for not inferring
it, like the reasons for not usually making interchangeable, in
the ordinary interpretation of writings, words as different as
"or" and "and." But the context of a writing may require an
"only," or it may change an "and" to "or" or an "or" to "and."
27

capital punishment. See, also,

dissenting).

See note 9, supra.

251 Cr. 137 (U.S.,

to

Co., 1965).

..

24

objections

Was Justice Done? The Rosenberg-Sobell Case (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1956); Walter and Miriam Schneir,

Panorama, Jan-

v. Virginia ex reI.
(1964) (by Mr. Justice Black).

Wheeling Steel Corporation v. Glander, 337 U.S.
(1949). Compare Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358
522 (1959).

562
U.S.

43

Compare, again, Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, supra,
extended dictum is carefully limited in its appli
cation. Compare also Weaver v. Palmer Brothers, 270 U.S.
402 (1926) and especially Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S.
105 (1928) (Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process).
The useful purposes of the negative implications of the
Commerce Clause could be served by a carefully drafted Act
of Congress or by the application to new problems of Equal
Protection doctrine. Existing applications of the "burden"
test could be left, during a period of evolution, as a diminish
note 42. An

ing

monument to stare

decisis.

44 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
U.S. 41 L.W. 4407 (1973). See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d
584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971). See also note
36, supra. It will be seen that the California Supreme Court

applied distinctions resembling those suggested in this essay.
John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard Univ.
Press, 1971) has some relation to the sequence of the preced
ing discussion. The abortion case is commented on in
note #40, supra.

17

45

18

See, also, the "Proceedings in the Supreme Court of the
United States in Memory of Mr. Justice Black,'> April 18,
1972, reported in 405 U.S. v-Ivii. (1972). The tribute read by
the Solicitor General includes a long quotation from Mr. Jus
tice Black's dissenting opinion in Mr. Anastaplo's case. The
authors of this tribute add after the quotation an interesting
comment which may, one hopes, represent an opinion about
future bar admission problems: "[Mr. Justice
Black's] stirring
dissent in Anastaplo, quoted above, led to a long exchange
of letters with the unsuccessful petitioner and, more im
portantly, to an ultimate change of the Court's position.
Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); In re Stolar,
401 U.S. 23 (1971)." 405 U.S. xxiv.
46
Walton H. Hamilton and Douglass Adair, The Power to
Govern:
The Constitution-Then and Now (New York:
W. W. Norton & Co., 1937).

47

Adair

v.

U.S., 208 U.S. 161 (1908). See

notes 12

and 13,

supra.
48

Thornhill

California,

v.

Alabama, 310
(1940).

U.S. 88

(1940); Carlson

v.

310 U.S. 106

49
He has been expelled since 1960 from both the com
misars' Russia and the colonels' Greece. See, e.g., The Con

stitutionalist, pp. xiii, 564-566; 116 Congo Rec. E10520 (Dec.
18,1970); 117 Congo Rec. E6129 (June 17, 1971); 117 Congo
Rec. E8492 (July 29,1971); 117 Congo Rec. E13889
(Dec. 17,
1971); 118 Congo Rec. E8149 (Sept. 27, 1972), E8811 (Oct.
17, 1972), E8903 (Oct. 25, 1972).
50

United States V. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). A change in
approach followed quickly. Steward Machine CO. V. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937). Compare Ashwander V. Tennessee Val
ley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
51 A
review by Laurence Berns of The Constitutionalist
(Dallas Morning News, Nov. 28, 1971, p. 6H) includes the
following observations on Mr. Anastaplo's Notes:
"As the author explores in his Notes the question of what
kind of character in the people free institutions and self
government presuppose, the reader is led into depth
after depth-that is, the reader who is able to
accept the
author's invitation to explore. The range of topics dealt
with penetratingly and carefully in these notes must be
seen

to

be believed: this part of the book is like a little
a second
University of Chicago (the author's

university,

alma mater).

"Scarcely any important
years, it seems, has been

political event of the last forty
neglected in Anastaplo's Notes;
but far more important is the wealth of discriminating
references, comment, and often detailed analysis of the
anthropological, sociological, psychological, and above
all poetic and philosophical writing that the author has
found useful for his explorations into the nature of
American institutions, into the meaning of the American
life, the nature of man, the nature of nature.
Serious students of American institutions, of political
life, arid of what transcends and is the ground of polit
ical life have here a guide to where to go as they face
the dilemmas posed by the realization that the good
citizen and the good man are not simply identical. Stu
dents of the law will be pleasantly surprised to learn
how fascinating their field of study can be.
"The author seems, judging roughly from the
frequency
of references, to have learned most from Shakespeare,
from his fellow Illinoisan Abraham Lincoln, and from
Plato. This book is' a major attempt to discover and ar
ticulate the harmony, or at least the compatibility, that
exists between the principles of the American
polity and
the principles of classical ('Greek') philosophy."
See, among other reviews of The Constitutionalist, the fol
lowing: C. Herman Pritchett, 60 Calif. L. Rev. 1476 (1972);
L. A. Powe, Jr., 8 Crim. L. Bull. 350 (1972); A.
J. Thomas,
way of

Southwest Review, Winter 1972, p. vi; Gary L Starkmam,

Chicago Sun-Times, June 18, 1972, sec: 5, p. 18; Elmer Gertz,
Panorama-Chicago Daily News, Jan. 22-23, 1972, p. 7; Wil
liam Gangi, Nation, Sept. 18, 1972, p. 218; Fred J.
Naffziger,
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 3, 1972,
p. 3B. See, also, New

York Times Book Review, June 18, 1972, p. 33
(where The
Constitutionalist was advertised by some of Mr. Anastaplo's
University
Chicago students as "the thinking woman's

of"

treasure trove
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See,

).

e.g., Gordon

Pall, "On Sums of Squares," 40 Amer
Monthly 10 (1933); Robert E. Horton,
Solutions (533)," Mathematics Magazine,

ican Mathematical

"Problems and
201-202
Mr.

(1964).
Anastaplo reports that he

was encouraged in his
specu
lations about symmetry and the nature of things upon hearing
Werner Heisenberg's lecture of April 30, 1973 at the Univer
sity of Chicago. Dr. Heisenberg concluded his lecture by
observing that physicists should now replace the concept of
"fundamental particles" by the concept of "fundamental

symmetries."

Reflections

on

Consumerism
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Richard A. Posner"

In

recent years

consumer

host of

new

the country has been swept by
imprint is visible in

movement whose
statutes and

with the

judicial

a

a

rules concerned

of the

plight
deceived, the coerced, or the
endangered consumer. My purpose here is to sort
out the major kinds of
consumer-protection pro
grams that have emerged, to discuss their economic
foundations and consequences and-less
hopefully
-to attempt an
explanation of why consumer
protection has become a significant element of our
public policy.
Ten years ago one could have justly described the
consumer as typically the victim rather than the
beneficiary of economic regulation. We had an
agricultural policy designed to increase the income
of farmers at the expense of consumers; a labor
policy designed to increase the income of workers at
the expense of consumers (and other
the

workers);

The

theory

consumers,

Such

a

conclusion

was

attractive not

Act)

is to

only because

it coincided 'with the results of observation but also

because it

*

was

plausible

on

theoretical

grounds.

This presentation by Richard A. Posner,
Professor
of Law, The University of Chicago, was made at a
conference on government policy and the consumer
at the University
of Rochester, Graduate School of
Management, October 27, 1972.

predict

that

number and the

has in

consumer

This
older

approach' worked well
regulatory statutes. Even

Federal Trade Commission's

activities,

a

one

with most of the
in the

case

consumer

of the

protection
a
major

could find evidence that

albeit covert purpose was to protect established
firms from the competition of new
products.
The old consumer-victimization
programs are
us but the
past few years have seen a series
of legislative and judicial initiatives-the
still with

product,

of the resurgent consumer movement
whose most prominent advocate has been
Ralph
Nader-that seem to contradict the
that

apparently,

theory

economic

regulation redistributes

wealth from

to

concentrated groups of

producers.

the

few nota

large

to

program, would be especially
difficult to organize into an effective political
group.

purpose in fact of most

a

us

particular regulatory

explicable

regulation (with

by

virtue of their

small stake that any individual

ICC, CAB and other administrative agencies in
order to enforce cartel pricing. Looking broadly at
government regulation of the economy one could
find substantial support for the conclusion that the
ble exceptions, such as the Sherman
redistribute wealth from consumers.

of cartels would lead

sumers

sumer-protection programs may not,
do much for the consumer; but
they
as

devices

by which

as we
are

con

Con

shall see,

readily
exploit

not

other groups

consumer.

These programs can be divided into three
major
groups. The first comprises measures designed to
increase the consumer's information about
uct. A notable
example is the

a

prod

"truth-in-lending"

legislation. The second group comprises measures
designed to protect consumers against sales methods
deemed exploitive, but where no issue of
deception
is involved. Here the courts have been the
principal
innovators, a noteworthy example being the Su
preme Court's recent Fuentes decision which out

lawed statutes that permit installment sellers to
goods from a defaulting purchaser without

repossess
a

prior hearing. The third group comprises

meas-

designed to protect consumers from physical
hazards in products. The law requiring seat belts in
automobiles is an example. These measures should
ures

be

distinguished from safety regulations designed to

knowledge is therefore not an exogenous
condition of effective competition. Moreover, since
information is costly both to create and to absorb,
consumer

the optimum amount of such information is

only, people whom the consumer
might endanger. Thus laws regulating the brakes on

protect, also

or

cars, unlike seat belt rules, are not pure consumer
protection measures. The courts have also been

active in this

strictly

liable

anyone

More and

more

ruling
(that is, even if he was
injured as a result of a

are

to

area.

that the seller of

courts

defect in the

analogous
being
regulated by the CAB or motor carriers from being
regulated by the ICC or lawyers and physicians
from occupational licensure by the states. Perhaps
some day the sellers will succeed in twisting these
laws to their benefit, but meanwhile they are
sustaining costs not offset by benefits from them. I
may be overstating the point. Conceivably the
automobile safety laws, for example, operate to
reduce the price advantage of imported cars and so
strengthen the competitive position of the domestic
manufacturers. But it seems unlikely that this kind
of explanation will be able to reconcile the consumer
producer

consumer

as

a

eat's

groups.

examine the economic effects and

possible
justifications of the consumer-protection
movement. I begin with measures designed to
Let

us

economic

increase the flow of accurate information
consumer

governmental

measures

consumer's information

as

are never

question, it seems to
On the one hand, it is surely

that since the

of

matter

a

theory

improve the
appropiate. The

to increase

or

me, is

a

difficult

incorrect to argue

of

be confident that

is

Suppose one of my
misrepresenting the qualities of his

product. If his false advertising is effective the sales
of my product will be impaired and this will give
me an incentive to incur costs to combat his decep
tion. But my incentive to rebut his falsities will be

limited

the

by

sustained.

In

amount
cases

of injury my business has
amount of sales

where the

diverted from any single seller is small, no seller
may have an incentive to take effective steps to
the

dispel

deception

even

though

the aggregate

the consuming public may be substantial.
this is why disparagement of competitors is

to

injury

Perhaps
apparently infrequent.
A
a

partial answer is provided by

trade associations,

traditional function of which has been to

police

against false advertising. But in a way this is part of
the question, for it is something of a mystery how
trade associations

are

able

to exist in

the face of the

where the association

free-rider

problem. Certainly
engaged in suppressing false advertising, rather
than in selling a service to members that is not
available to nonmembers, the nonmember derives
about the same benefits as the member, and at zero
is

cost.

Trade associations do exist and do engage in a
amount of policing of false advertising;

certain

there

are

also important intermediaries between

and consumers, such

as department stores,
that ascertain and guarantee the quality of products.
There are, in short, private methods that operate to

sellers

theoretical
one.

about

products.

I would not argue that

cannot

competitors

the benefits that airlines derive from

paw of

one

lems that may be serious.

that the sellers derive benefits from them

with the view of the

hand,

product is
not negligent)
a

These laws limit the freedom of action of, and im
pose costs on, the sellers subject to them. I do not see

statutes

On the other

market processes alone will generate the optimum
amount of information. There are free-rider prob

state supreme

product.

to

not

infinite.

prevent deception and provide
accurate information about

consumers

product qualities

with
and

prices but there is enough of a free-rider problem to
make one cautious about claiming that the free

perfect competition, as
conventionally formulated, explicitly assumes per
fect knowledge about product qualities and prices,
measures for increasing the
existing, and obviously
of
consumers
are prima facie
imperfect, knowledge

Whatever the theoretical uncertainties, there are
practical reasons for suspecting that the recent

warranted. The conventional formulation is mis

measures

leading.

It

theory

ignores the fact that market

themselves generate information about

processes

products;

market will
sumers

provide as much information
willing to pay for.

as

con

would be

designed to increase the consumer's infor
mation about products are misconceived. The truth
in-lending law is an illustration. The assumption of

the law is that if
interest rate that

22

people knew the percentage
they were paying to borrow

they would, in many
they would shop successfully
money,

There is in fact little basis for

cases, not

for

a

borrow,

or

cheaper lender.

expecting these behav

interest-rate

figure.
require the seller-lender

To

disclose the interest

number of months

of the act.

useful

percentage interest

rate

that is the form in

bec�use

which the return to invested

capital

is

ordinarily

require

a

seller

the

to

known
is to

consumer

the annual cost of the borrowed money, expressed
also as a percentage, will be. But for a consumer,

I would still argue that the

the percentage rate of interest is usually a quite
useless detail of the transaction. He is interested in

of

the total cost of the

following

money to

buy

the

chase from the seller

the combination of seller

(or
lender) where his total cost, including interest
charge, is lowest. To repeat, it is the total cost that
and

plague comparison

a

shopping

for

a

color

television set, is quoted three prices: $450 cash; $20
a month for 36 months;
$22 a month for 36

months. He should be able

enough

that if he

buys

to

out

higher

or

than if he

from the first and that if he decides to

time, the second seller

buy

on

than the third. He

is

cheaper
will have to compare the advantage of paying a
lower price all at once with the advantage (crucial
if he does not have $450) of paying a larger amount
in monthly installments that he can afford. He will
not be helped in this comparison
by an interest-rate
unless
he
is
in
the
habit of saying to himself:
figure
%." He would be
"my personal discount rate is
__

well advised to find out what

him,

a

bank would

charge

month, if he borrowed $450 from it to buy
the set for cash, but if he does this, he will still be
amounts, not percentages. Thus
comparing dollar
I
will he be guided to the purchase that is optimum
from his standpoint without ever being given an
per

To
not

without

a

oversimpli

to compare

the

(a similar problem

consumer

/

is

policies).
normally

will

percentage interest rate. Suppose in
one

our

example

seller offers the

terms: $10 a month for 24 months, plus
$600 due the twenty-fifth month. The buyer can

readily compute
total amount he

that under this payment plan, the
pays-$840-is greater than under

the alternative

plans

available to him.

He must

balance the additional burden against the advantage
to him of a lower monthly payment the first two

Again

I would contend that unless the pur
thinking in terms of percent

age discount rates,
is

higher-or
plan than under

a

disclosure that the interest

lower-under the
the other

rate

balloon-payment

plans will

not

be useful

to

him.

readily

from either the second

third seller the total cost will be

buys

figure

cost

of life insurance

of the color-television set that

years.

consumer,

consumer.

have all the information he wants without disclosure

chaser is accustomed to

a

a

buyer

of alternative transactions

competing sellers of the product.
Assume that

impose

make it difficult for the credit

he is interested in, not the interest component, and
being able to compare total cost as between

in

the

is somewhat

preceding analysis

said to

product he is buying. This will
charge if he is using borrowed
product. He will therefore pur

by

fied, however, in that it ignores such complications
as balloon
payments and service charges which may

nine per cent per annum, you want to know what

interest

give the borrower

benefit.

corresponding
The

are

cost

an

compute and

to

disclose information that is

to

expressed. If you are planning to invest borrowed
money in real estate that has an expected return of

include

not

useful information. The interest rate is superfluous
if the cash charge, the monthly charge, and the

ioral consequences except in the case of the profes
sional investor, who does not require the protection

A person borrows either to invest or to buy a
good. In the first case it is useful to know the

does

rate

The

tion)

concern

of the

with

exploitation (other

consumer

has centered

than

decep
various

on

devices for the enforcement of creditors'

rights.

There is the holder-in-due-course rule that permits
the holder of commercial paper to enforce the
consumer's debt
defective

to

him free of the defenses

merchandise)
a suit
by the

in

that the

(such as
might

consumer

seller of the

good for non
There
is
the creditor's right of summary
payment.
repossession, extinguished by the Fuentes case (at
least for some consumer transactions). There is the
more general
problem of clauses in so-called "adhe
sion" (standard or printed) contracts that waive
various rights that the consumer enjoys under gen
interpose

eral contract law.

The attacks

on

these

provisions proceed from the
enjoys greater bargaining

premise that the seller

1

power than the

buyer and so is able to impose
provisions that the buyer would reject
there parity of bargaining power. Analysis

does, after all, enable the lender to dispense with an
investigation of the quality and probity of the seller's
operations. Were the lender liable for the seller's
misconduct, the lender might have to conduct such
an
investigation or include an additional risk pre

coercive
were

must therefore

concept of

begin with an examination
"bargaining power."

The level of discussion of

would

surely

be raised if the

banned and the

user

forced

to

of the term

find

mium in the lending
charge; in either

problems

consumer

use

of the

exercise would show that when

a person
alleges
he
unequal bargaining power
means, or can be
shown to mean, one of three
things: one of the

an

parties

the transaction is

to

due to

perhaps

term,

ignorant

of

an

defense against the seller in a collection suit: this
presumably decrease the seller's costs and be
reflected on an increase in his
It is

would

essential

misrepresentation by

rational for

the

products

other; one of the parties has a monopoly; one of the
parties is compensated for accepting a term that is
favorable to the other party.

make the

unequal

the installment

plan

that many consum
consequence of buying on

possible

one

costly. If there are
monopoly in the applica
tion of the rule they can be dealt with
directly,
without forcing up the cost of installment
purchases
generally.

problems

to a finance
company which
the consumer, if he defaults, in an
action in which the consumer cannot assert the
defenses he would have against the seller. If such

then

sue

seller's
rance

is

widespread, and if the cost of the
dispelling it is lower than the cost of igno

ignorance

to the consumer

and the cost to the

of

becoming informed,

to

require the seller

of

an

installment sale

the

consumer

appropriate remedy

is

disclose the consequences

to

more

clearly;

it is

a

deception

be sure, the information may be of the
useless sort because most of the people who are sued
case.

To

by finance companies
more

may not be

willing

to pay

in order to preserve all of their defenses. But

in any event the

complaint

would be

deception

rather than coercion.
A second

possibility

is that sellers and finance
to

to agree to waive

force all installment
their defenses

against

sellers in actions by the finance
companies. It is
most unlikely that there is such a
conspiracy. Retail

selling and consumer financing are both highly
competitive fields. If there is a conspiracy the
solution is to attack the conspiracy, lest the conspir
ators simply switch the focus of the
conspiracy to
another

term in

.

deception

of

more

or

The third major thrust of the
consumer-protectoward increasing the

tion movement has been

safety

of

products. My analysis here is a
deception. The
approach the
optimal level of safety but they may not be sufficient
consumer

little similar to my earlier analysis of
market itself creates incentives to
to attain it.

The cost

involves

a

to

the

hazard

consumer

of

health

or

to

product that
safety has two
and
an expected
product

elements: the price of the
accident or illness cost that

can

a

be viewed

as

the

cost of the insurance

companies have conspired

purchasers

off rather than better off

consumer worse

by making credit purchases

is that the seller may discount

the consumer's note

can

to

Outlawing the holder-in-due-course rule is a goal
consumer movement but if the
foregoing
analysis is correct the abolition of the rule is likely to

bargaining power.

that

credit

or

of the

ers are unaware

prices.)
quite
prefer lower prices for
retention of certain legal.

consumers to

defenses.

The holder-in-due-course rule will illustrate the
utility of thus decomposing the charge of
It is

the cost of

purchasing goods
higher. (Alter
natively, the seller might agree to indemnify the
lender for any loss resulting from
interposition of a

were

synonym. Such

a

case

credit would be

on

the sales

relationship.
The third and most realistic possibility is that the
holder-in-due-course rule is accepted by consumers
because it minimizes the

cost of

goods

to

them. It

premium necessary to insure
against the hazard created by the product. Compe

tition should

ods

can

be

operate

to compress

developed

accident cost

for

this cost. If meth

reducing

the

expected

lower than the saving, they
will be developed. To be sure, this conclusion must
be qualified by reference to the existence of diver
at

a

cost

gent attitudes toward risk. If
the

averse,

higher

than the

lower if

they

competitive
mum

cost-justified
are

safety

are

risk

will be

expected accident cost; it will be
risk prefering. In either event, the

process should work toward

level of

There is,

consumers

level of

an

opti

product safety.

however,

an

information

problem

that

23

undermines this conclusion. Most
24

people .have

very

little direct experience of accidents and it is difficult
for them to judge whether, say, seat belts reduce the
accident cost of

expected

driving

an

automobile,

or

special type of bottle construction would
reduce the chance of a coke bottle's exploding in
one's face. In principle, the innovator of such a

whether

safety

a

advance has

makes

incentive

an

to

inform

possible.

An inevitable consequence of such
to

is to

a

the consumer's

bring
safety problems of which, lacking

campaign, however,
attention

the

of the reduced hazards that the advance

consumer

direct

experience, he may be unaware. The result might
actually be to induce some consumers to substitute

products that were safer. Very few people,
for example, think often (or ever) about the danger
of exploding bottles; the danger is indeed slight. If
different

a

soft-drink manufacturer advertised that his bottle

reduced the
concern

danger,

one

effect would be to

in the consumer's mind where

strict-liability standard will induce
firms to take safety precautions that they would not
take if they were not liable. Since under a strict-lia
bility standard the cost of accidents is a cost to the
seller, he will adopt any safety precaution that is
cheaper than that cost. If he were free to negotiate
with his risk-preferring consumers over the level of
safety, the result would be a less safe product, as they
would prefer." Observe, though, that it is the lower,
not the higher, safety standard that is optimal in
terms of consumer preferences.
risk preferring,

plant

none

a

Second, the

their

products,

improvements.

Recognition

advertising

sort

can

backfire led the cigarette manufacturers, with the
FTC's blessing, to agree to discontinue references to
tar

and nicotine content in their

advertising.

The

the fact that the members of

example two-edged:
the industry had to agree to discontinue such refer
ences suggests that, in the absence of such collusion,
they would have continued. Still, this kind of adver
tising may be relatively infrequent because of its
boomerang potential.
is

To

complete

tant to inform

the

producers are reluc
safety improvements,
not otherwise forthcoming,

analysis,

consumers

and if the information is

if

of

producers will be reluctant to undertake them: such
improvements will lack clear-cut marketing value.
Of course it does not follow that the particular
safety measures required by the government for
automobiles and other products have been cost-jus
tified; but this is a question on which I am ill
informed.

due to
A

them to make any improvements that reduce their
net expected accident costs.
But the

foregoing discussion

liability

no

and to this latter
ments

do

not

liability but, in recent
negligence to strict liability,

to strict

years anyway, from

the above two argu
the manufacturer
that
Assuming

movement

apply.

is forbidden to disclaim
a

is somewhat mislead

since the movement in the law has not been

from
of this

(net) expected accident cost of
difficulty in marketing safety
strict-liability standard induces

nities to reduce the

ing,
that

point discussed above

information

suggests that firms may sometimes forgo opportu

had

existed before.

a

negligence

liability

for his

standard will lead him to

negligence,
adopt any

cost-justified improvements." If disclaimer is per
mitted, then either a negligence or strict liability
standard becomes the

equivalent

of

no

liability.

Thus, given negligence liability, a movement to
strict liability seems unlikely to increase product
safety. And, again given negligence liability, the
utility of many direct governmental regulations of

safety

is called into

question.

I conclude that there

are

economic

grounds

for

questioning whether a completely free market will
bring about an optimum level either of product
information or product safety. (The argument of
«exploitation" based on «unequal bargaining pow
er," however, lacks, so far as I can see, any

basis.) But that the free market is unlikely
perfectly is not a sufficient condition for

economic

The

movement

toward the imposition of strict

liability for injury resulting from defective products
is frequently defended on the ground that it will
products. This may be correct if the
alternative is no liability (caveat emptor), although
for reasons not expressed by the judges and lawyers
who take this position. First, if many consumers are
lead to safer

to

work

government intervention, since government, too, is

invariably imperfect in actual operation. If truth-in
lending legislation and restrictions on consumer
financing practices are typical examples of how
government intervention

likely

to

operate,

we

to

protect the

may well

prefer

consumer

to

rely

on

is
a

highly imperfect market. The evaluation of the
government's efforts in the area of safety is some
what more complex, although Sam Peltzman's
recent paper

8

suggests that here

intervention may often be
I also conclude that the

for the

too

government

counterproductive.
efficiency justifications

consumer-protection movement are too ten
theory and practice, to explain the move
Here, then, is an important area of public

lation

passed

them

to

do

in their
so.

favor, only that

It is

politically

consequences would be very severe for shareholders
and employees of the affected firms, and the benefits

contrast, would be highly diffuse.
But diffuse benefits may be sufficient to procure
to consumers, in

of measures, such

enactment

ment.

measures, the costs of which

traditional

very difficult to

eliminate the motor carriers' cartel because the

uous, in

neither

it is hard for

as

consumer-protection

are

also diffuse.

9

More

explicable
policy
public-interest grounds nor on grounds of effective
political power. How then is it to be explained?
This, it seems to me, is our most challenging and
baffling question.
The following points occur to me as elements of

over, there are concentrated and substantial benefits
conferred by such measures, not on consumers, but

the

would impose substantial and concentrated costs on
American industry, but perhaps it can obtain a

that

seems

on

answer:

1.

the economic dimensions of the

Ignorance of

consumer

problem

is

pervasive characteristic of

a

problem. The efficiency
public
(and distributive) effects of forbidding certain meth
ods of financing consumer transactions are obvious
to a few people steeped in economic theory and
profoundly un obvious to everyone else. This ig
norance is to be distinguished from the ignorance of
discussion of the

businessman who cannot tell you what the term
"marginal cost" means. Since the concept, although

small but influential minority who believe
passionately in the abuses of the competitive process
on

a

and the iniquities of

minority

is

large firms. I doubt that the
strong enough to obtain legislation that

symbolic victory over the forces of deception, ex
ploitation, and hazard-which may be all that it
really wants.

1

Rigorously argued and supported in George J. Stigler,
Regulation," 2 Bell J. Econ &
Management Sci. 3 (1971).
"The Theory of Economic

a

not

the term, is

an

inescapable

and intuitive feature

of business activity, his ignorance of formal theory
has no consequences for his behavior; and so with

the

consumer

who has

function." But there is

never

heard of

"utility

a

nothing intuitively
outlawing the

about the economic effects of

obvious
holder

in-due-course rule. The finance companies should
understand its effect on their practices and they

2
See Richard A. Posner, "The Federal Trade Commission,"
37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 47 (1969).
3

It should be

noted, however, that the effective-political
approach, properly understood, allows for redistribution
to particular consumer as well as particular industry groups.
See Richard A. Posner, "Taxation by Regulation," 2 Bell J.
Econ. & Management Sci. 22 (1971).
group

4

Fuentes

5

See 1960 FTC Ann. Rep. 82.

v.

Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).

may try to educate the consumer advocates; but to
the latter, the concepts will be alien and the source

6
Suppose the expected accident cost to the buyer of a coke
bottle, which may explode, is .1¢. Under a strict-liability
standard the bottler can expect to be liable for this cost and

suspect.

he will therefore adopt any safety measures that enable a net
reduction in it. If he were not liable, and ignoring the in
formation point discussed earlier, he would adopt only those
safety measures whose cost consumers are willing to cover
in the form of a higher price for the product. Consumers
who are risk preferring will not necessarily be willing to pay
for a safety measure that brings about a net reduction in ex
pected cost. They may prefer the higher risk of an accident
to the certainty of paying to reduce that risk.

2. The costs of

tend to be

(b)

(a)

consumer-protection programs
diffuse rather than concentrated and

low. The programs typically cover entire indus
so that the added costs they impose (which

tries

only a small fraction of the cost of
the industry's product) can be reflected in higher
prices with only a small decline in sales and profits.
anyway represent

Hence, the incentive of the affected sellers

to incur

opposing such programs is relatively small.
3. The interest-group theory of the political proc

costs in

ess

does not hold that

consumers

never

get legis-

7
See Richard A. Posner, "Strict Liability: A Comment," 2
J Leg. Studies 205 (1973).

8

The Benefits and Costs of New Drug

Regulation (Dept. of

Econ., U.C.L.A.).
9
Cf. James Q. Wilson, The Politics of
(Dep't of Cov't, Harv. Univ.).

Business

Regulation
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The 1970 Census Enumeration
As
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A Social Action

Report Card

Julian Levi*

Wood, the Board Chairman of
Company who led that giant
the retail business, once said that his favorite

General

Robert

Sears Roebuck &

into

reading

was

The Statistical Abstract of the United

States, which

consists

of materials drawn

primarily

"financial assistance to the States
r

and

political

subdivisions thereof for the elimination of unsafe
and

insanitary housing conditions, for the eradi
slums, for the provision of decent, safe,
and sanitary dwellings for families of low income,

cation of

from the United States Census enumerations.

and for the reduction of

Publication has commenced of the volumes deal
ing with the general social and economic character

stimulation of business activity, to create a United
States Housing Authority." Year after year the
Congress has pumped hundreds of millions of dollars

istics for the United States

en

various states of the Union

enumerations. This data

not, be used to

test

toto

as

and then for the

shown

ought,

by the 1970
probably will

but

the effectiveness of

our

domestic

governmental problems. Specifically:
Since the 1920s states have enacted
tion with the

thought

that the control of land

uses

and densities would assist in the maintenance of
values and the

of

stable society.
Since 1937 the Federal Government has provided

development

a

and the

into this program.

Since 1949 in support of "the

home and

family"

zoning legisla

unemployment

goal

of

a

decent

suitable, decent environment for every
the Congress has pumped hundreds of
a

millions of dollars each year into slum clearance,
urban renewal, model cities and community devel

opment programs.
Since 1965, through Title I of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act, the Congress has
authorized and

appropriated something

over

six

and one-half billion dollars in order to improve the
educational opportunities for the children of low
*

A

presentation by Julian H. Levi, Professor of
Studies, The University of Chicago, at a
meeting of the San Diego law alumni on Novem
ber 20, 1972.
Urban

income families.

Housing and building
have exercised their

of health and

safety

codes in which the states

police power for the purposes
have been with us for well over

a

century and
The

more

half.

a

legislation just

than

a

enumerated is, of course, no
fraction of what is now on the books. I

propose that we look at the 1970 Census and certain
other materials, all incidentally in the public domain,

and then
To set

found

judge the achievement of these programs.
the size of our universe, the 1970 Census

our

million

total

population

people,

to

be

approximately

178 million of whom

were

22V2 million black, and 9,200,000 of
Spanish

Of this

number,

149 million

203

white;

heritage.

lived in

urban

communities; 42 million in rural non-farm areas;
and lOV2 million in rural farm areas.

Accordingly,
population from rural areas to urban
conditions continued, as well as the flow of blacks
the drift of

from the rural south to urban centers. The black
population in this country is increasingly an urban

population.

Of the 221/2 million

in central cities

compared

blacks,

58 % lived

with 28 % of the white

population.
Analysis of the urban population discloses that 76
million live in suburbs compared with 64 million in
the central cities. Since 1950 central cities added 10
million people; the suburbs added 35 million.
Half of all

metropolitan
city limits.

employment
areas

in the

In the Los

in the

country

Angeles-Long

fifteen
is

now

largest
outside

Beach standard

metropolitan area, for instance, in 1970 there was a
reported total of 2,483,000 workers, of whom 1,133,000 worked

in the cities and

1,350,000 worked

in the suburbs.

Employment, or what is more to the point unem
ployment, is not uniformly distributed among the
population. In California in 1970 of the total labor
force 6 % was unemployed but whereas 5.7 % of the
white labor force was unemployed, 10.6 % of the
black population was unemployed and 7 % of Span
ish heritage were unemployed.
Of even greater significance to those interested in
crime and delinquency are the figures for males 14
and 15 year� old. In California 12.4 % of this total
group were unemployed-for whites the figure was
11.6 % ; for blacks 29 % ; and for youths of Spanish

heritage

16.5 %.

Median income of all families in California was
per year, but $7,484 per year for blacks.

$10,732

Statistics

as

to

housing

conditions

are

not

yet

available. The sole indicium now shown relates to
the percentage of households lacking some or all
plumbing facilities. Nationally the statistic is 2.7%.

However, as to households with income less than
the poverty level the figure is 8.4 % and as to non
metropolitan areas 25.9%. The comparable San

Diego figure, incidentally,

for all households is-

1.9 % but for poverty families 4.4 %.
I would suggest that it not be necessary that
you
be burdened with statistics as to broken homes,

unemployment, dependency,

crime and delin
All
of
this
follows
from
the materials just
quency.
enumerated.

The central city is increasingly a backwater,
separated from the growth elements of the American
economy. Paradoxically, at the very time when the
need for government services to a low-income
pop
ulation develops, the assets upon which the
city
must

rely

The results

out.

startling
they
predicted
reports of Presidential
Commissions, Congressional Committees, Planning
move

are

not

in the

were

and Educational Authorities-world without endl
The plumbing statistic is a good place to

begin
adequate, sanitary facilities is
not a matter of taste or
luxury, nor is the risk
limited to the particular household concerned.
Epi
the

analysis.

Lack of

demics

are no
respecters of income characteristics.
Moreover, the lack of sanitary facilities is only the

glaring evidence of conditions dangerous to
safety. If the pattern of former years
continues, we will find an appreciably larger per
centage of households lack adequate fire exits and
most

health and

safe electrical

wiring and are overcrowded.
These conditions present a blatant,
continuing
violation of local housing and building codes. The
facts are apparent to any building inspector and, in
truth, they

may be

photographed.

There is, nevertheless, a pretense about this
business all over the country. Enforcement of hous
ing and building codes occurs in the half world of
the

quasi-criminal

sessed,

is

more a

violation. The fine, if ever as
a deterrent. Effective

license than

enforcement

ought to be an administrative, rather
judicial, proceeding. Some states now permit
this alternative which, however, has not been taken
up by a single municipality. Most recently the
than

a

authorities of New York State refused
an effort in New York
City.

to

finance

such

Two well known doctrines have

long existed in
law. First, that a contract ought to be inter
preted in accordance with the intentions of the
our

parties; and, second, compliance with the law
fundamental

to

the exercise of

jurisdiction.

is

Yet

27

related instances,
demonstrative of our failure:
there
28

are

two

among

been to separate employment generating use from
place of residence. Increasingly the city neighbor

others,

hood becomes

Both landlord and tenant in any multi-unit resi
dential structure anticipate that the landlord will
the essential services

required

provide
dwelling unit habitable.
cold running
not

water

fiat of land

anticipate that the tenant will be tinkering with

case

after

pump. Now in almost all

and

built,

or

use.

The true value of

human habitation

ought

to

a

structure

public policy

to

confiscation,

is

from the

is

hand of

"The

the world

one can

find

factory, properly shielded
perfectly acceptable neighbor. Our

where the

a

transit and in

mass

heavy,

employment may
and unwarranted,

zoning.

In 1956 Catherine

housing,

over

Bower, commenting

on

public

said:

tendency

projects

is

of normal families to reject our
an illness that may

indication of

an

well be fatal."

unfit for

be the value of the

to

transport

narcotics. But how many instances do any of

us

proceedings value
reflects lawful income rather than the capitalization
of income achieved only in violation of the building
know where in Urban Renewal

intervening sixteen years the Federal Govern

In the

raw

generally subject

to-wit the automobile used to

case

often be traced to the

ment

land, less the cost of removing the structure. Even
this suggestion is generous. Property which is used
contrary

In cities

use.

difficulties in

relationships between buyer and seller, or
lender and borrower, on the American scene the
performance of one party is' conditional upon per
formance by the other. Yet as a result of nothing
more than a historic accident, the tenant's obligation
to pay rent is considered independent of the land
lord's obligation to perform his part of the bargain.
Ordinarily we determine value on the assumption
of legal operation-the highest and best use of a
property is considered to be its highest and best
of the

lawful

separated

growth elements of the American economy. The
problem of an industrial use in a residential neigh
borhood is really an issue of nuisance rather than a

to make the

The tenant expects hot and
and the landlord certainly does

the hot water heater

backwater

a

/

spent hundreds of millions of dollars in public

housing subsidies and in the financing of additional
units only now to have the Secretary of the Depart
ment of Housing and Urban Development say what
ought to have been clear a decade or more ago-the
program

was a

total failure.

has been told again and again-eligi
for either entrance into or retention of public

The

story

originally attacked as socialist interference with the
rights of property, are now enshrined as the greatest
legislative innovations of this century on the theory
that proper zoning enables a governmental unit "to
keep them out." Recently Bernard Seigan published

bility
housing requires low income. Improvement in in
come and employment is rewarded with an eviction
notice. The result is that the family mix increasingly
is represented by the broken home, welfare family
and at that point public housing is no longer hous
ing for people only with low income, it becomes
instead the county welfare farm for socially disad
vantaged and dislocated people. The rejection pre
dicted by Catherine Bower has occurred. There are
hundreds and hundreds of vacancies in the public
housing projects in the larger cities of this country.

his LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING. For years
the City of Houston has been the horrid example of

limitations inherent in subsidized

code?

Zoning doctrine first emerged in the 1920s under
the aegis of Mr. Herbert Hoover, then United States
Secretary of Commerce. It is interesting to note that
regulations of land use, of density, and the like,

a

which

municipality
a municipal zoning

was so

to enact

there is not

one

development

as

backward

code.

as

to refuse

Seigan concludes

whit of difference between land

it has occurred in Houston without

benefit of zoning and land development elsewhere
where planners, lawyers and others have played
what Richard Babcock describes

as

THE ZONING

GAME.

What

Having thus had demonstrated

terproductive,
236 housing but

have done

by

enactment of

zoning has

that income
are coun

continued the device with Section

we

pleasant addi
only building housing for
tax shelter for yourself. The

to this

we

added

a

tional feature-instead of

the poor, you build a
motivation is, of course, quite clear. A full page ad
vertisement in the Chicago Tribune of November 1,

copy of the 1040 income tax
which is printed, "The Man with a Plan

1972, featured
return

we

to us

housing

asks

over

are

you fed

a

up?"

The Man with

a

Pla�

then

volunteers,

"to show you how to earn more, to own
far less income taxesl" This is the

and pay

more

announcement of

and says social science research is often not used

because:
29

the Final 1972 Tax Shelter Sem
"

inars-"The

Amazing Story of 56 Real Estate Part
nerships!" Admission, incidentally, is by advance
reservation only. Now, of course, there is nothing
wrong with the device of the tax incentive. Higher
education, both public and private, is dependent
upon that incentive. The difficulty in the housing
field is that the incentive has operated to produce
continued construction, particularly in the subsi
dized field which in the public interest ought to
have been halted years ago.
The advocates of housing legislation

bag-the planners,

the tax shelter

The late Carl
man,

are a

mixed

the

estate pro

moters, etc. A collection of these interests account
for the omnibus housing bill this past year which

justifiably fell of its own excessive weight. One
would hope that the new Secretary of the Depart
ment of Housing and Urban Development would
paraphrase Winston Churchill by saying that he has
come to preside over the
liquidation of much of the

looked upon this conclusion as "some kind of evi
dence on which they can base a decision." This con

according to Coleman commenting
Coleman, now produces dismay:

sequence,

"But I don't think that

a

judicial

decision

on

so

At the
"

same

time the author contends the

report

is:

appropriate for legislators and school
boards in encouraging the kind of student body
.

.

they

policy-making

Most of his

would be

obliged to take
seriously.
legislators
Most

to

recommen

his

recom

and school

accept the assumption

that the evidence submitted to them

as

a

basis for

making policy was of lesser quality than required
by a court. Therefore, unless Byoirism applies, the
source of financing the
report ought not to matter.
This month Christopher Jencks with his associates
published "Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect
of Family and Schooling in America." Jencks, of
course,

peted

was a

co-author with Coleman. The trum

conclusions

are:

"Educational reform
nomic

or

social

"Genes and
on

"School
or on

The

IQ

cannot

bring

about

eco

equality.

scores

have

relatively

little effect

economic success; and

quality

has little effect

on

achievement

economic success."

suggestion

is made that

society should get

on

with the task of

waiting for the
is

equalizing income rather than
day when everyone's earning power

Thus:

equal.

"Instead of trying

to

reduce

people's capacity

competitive advantage

a

we

would have to

so

as

on one

to

another,

change the rules of the game
reduce the rewards of competitive
and the costs of failure."

to

on

that evidence."

on

that

mendations

gain

whether certain school systems are obeying or
disobeying the constitution ought to be based

a

dations, he said, told his clients what they already
knew, but he charged them a great deal of money

agency and its programs.
In 1966 a group of professors, led

by Dr. James S.
Coleman, published EQUALITY OF EDUCA
TIONAL OPPORTUNITY, a study made possible
through a Federal grant of some millions of dollars.
That study concluded that black children did better
in the integrated middle-class classroom. In 1972,
Coleman again writes on the Coleman Report. He
says that while the Report showed, "that certain
kinds of attendance patterns provide higher achieve
ment for children from lower socio-economic levels,"
the courts in examining school attendance patterns

by

Byoir, pioneer public relations

equally cynical.

was

boards would be reluctant

packagers,

architects, the trade unions, the real

it's not commissioned

...

body."

success

Thus:

"Employers could be constrained to reduce wage
disparities between their best- and worst-paid
workers."

.

mix which

can

provide achievement benefits."

"The net effect would be

to make

those with the

most competence and luck subsidize those with

the least competence and luck to
extent than they do today."

a

adults

far greater

quality
teachers') lives more equal.

30
In

far

so

Jencks

in school for

education is concerned,

elementary

as

and his associates conclude:

a

why school
equal. First,
children seem to be far more influenced by
what happens at home than by what happens
in school. They may also be more influenced
by what happens on the streets and by what
they see on television. Second, reformers have

"There

be three

to

seem

but it would do

equal,

more

deal to make the

a

a

great

of children's

(and

Since children

significant accomplishment." (pgs. 255-256)

reasons

reform cannot make adults

more

just read to you
conflict
with
the
are
complete
premises of the
Federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act
Now, of

course, the conclusions

in

which

this

to

something
well

as

point represents

over

most

of the social

you would

legislation
that

those aspects of school

Logically

life that affect children.

Reallocating resources,
rewriting the curricu

and one-half billion dollars of

reassigning pupils,

and

change the way teachers and
students actually treat each other minute by

lum seldom

minute.

Third,

even

changes

are

when

a

school

exerts

an

children, the resulting
not likely to persist into adulthood.

unusual influence

on

huge change in elementary school
test scores, for example, to alter adult income
by a significant amount.
It takes

a

"These arguments suggest that the 'factory' mo
del which pervades both lay and professional

thinking

probably ought to be
'inputs'

about schools

abandoned. It is true that schools have
and

'outputs,'

and that

one

of their nominal

purposes is to take human 'raw material' (i.e.
children) and convert it into something more

'valuable'

(i.e. employable adults).

Our

re

search suggests, however, that the character of
a school's output depends largely on a single in

namely the characteristics of the entering
children. Everything else-the school budget,
its policies, the characteristics of the teachers
is either secondary or completely irrelevant.
put,

"Instead of

to

evaluating

effects

term

be

on

relatively

schools in terms of

long

their alumni, which appear
uniform, we think it wiser to

evaluate schools in terms of their immediate

teachers and students, which appear
variable: Some schools are dull,

effects

on

much

more

while others

terrifying places,
depressing,
are lively, comfortable, and reassuring.
even

think of school life

than

an

If

we

end in itself rather

end, such differ
enormously important. Eliminating

a means

ences are

as

to

some

other

these differences would not do much to. make

1972 would draw

effort.

assume

a

dollars,

as

of the 1960s.

book written in

upon the results of this six

greatly

No such

expenditure and
The basic

thing
Jencks
re-working of the Coleman 1966 data.
Jencks' defense, however, despite the six and

material is
In

disbursement of

a

six and one-half billion

over

very little control

are

fifth of their lives, this would be

occurs.

a

one-half billion dollars and the comings and goings
of the educationalists, both in and out of govern
ment, there is a remarkable paucity of data.
The

Jencks thesis,

example, pays no atten
tion whatsoever to the work of his colleague B. F.
Skinner or the work of other behaviorists throughout
as an

the country such as Dr. Israel Goldiamond at
Chicago. At the very time that the laboratory of the

examples of control and
change in human behavior, Jencks is concluding
that these things are impossible.
Thus the programs analyzed have achieved little.
In some cases they may even have aggravated the
very ills they sought to heal. What should we learn?
behaviorists

discloses

1. Time after time

we

have

proceeded

to

macro

and very little evidence.

programs upon great theory
It will be recalled that the current Model Cities

Program began

with

the United States

a

suggestion that a few cities in
to be encouraged to develop

ought

new and different programs to solve their difficulties.
Before the first dollar was appropriated or the

authorized, the notion had been enlarged
to include city after city over the country. Appro
priations at this moment run to some billions of
program

dollars and the first bit of evidence

as

to either

failure is yet to be received.
2. We do not solve human problems with brick

success or

and mortar. Public
It would be far

housing

more

is the obvious

effective and

example.
cheaper to

provide rent and purchase assistance to the poor
family as against the tax shelter to the promoter.

3. Institutional and bureaucratic

suffice. I have

answers

will

prepared by local
departments of health
which, in effect, assign to certain inner-city hospitals
the responsibility of medical care for adjoining pop
ulations since the private practitioner has departed.
In this exercise no one thought about asking the
not

seen

maps

boards of health and state

patient. What will medical
will it be

care

when those

accepted

be like and how

administering

the

know that the patient, whether he likes it
or not, has no alternative and when the
patient
knows that his choice is either to suffer or go to this
treatment

one

dispensary?

In

solution is money
the provider.

this,

to

as

in most other cases, the

the consumer; not

4. The 1970 Census thus
us.

encourage
with all our

For the vast

subsidy

both humble and

majority of

are

past generations.

testament to

our

citizens,

human

far

beyond

These

resource

the expec
stand as

successes

and effort for all

segments of the American population. Thus

couraged,
failures.

to

difficulties, the standard of living and

the amenities available
tations of

ought

a

we

ought

be emboldened

to

confess

en
our
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From The

Law School
32

Phil C. Neal

PHIL C. NEAL

RICHARD A. EpSTEIN

Neal, Professor of Law
School, was
reappointed Dean, effective January

an

Phil C.

and Dean of the Law

first ap
Dean in 1963 when he

1, 1973. Dean Neal

pointed

was

appointed dean
the Law School's 70 year history.
Prior to coming to Chicago in
became the sixth

1962

as

was on

for

seventeen years.

He

his

began

law clerk to Associate

Justice Robert H. Jackson of the
United States Supreme Court and
then

practiced

law for three years

in San Francisco.

Dean Neal studied at Harvard

University where he received his
degree summa cum laude and
his LL.B. degree magna cum laude.
An authority on constitutional
antitrust and administrative law,
Dean Neal has also been teaching
civil procedure. Among his current
projects he is writing a part of a
multi-volume history of the United
States Supreme Court in collabora
A.B.

tion with Professor Owen M. Fiss.

This volume will deal with the

period

from 1888-1910, when

Melville Weston Fuller, an Illinois
lawyer, was Chief Justice.
Dean Neal is

a

director of the

American Bar Foundation and

member of the

Chicago

a

Council of

Lawyers, the American Law In
stitute, the Chicago Bar Association,
the American Bar Association, the

Legal Club of Chicago, and the
Law Club of Chicago. He is also
a Fellow of the American
Academy
of Arts and Sciences.

effective July 1, 1973, having spent
the 1972-1973 academic year as a

Visiting
in

Professor of Law, Dean Neal
the faculty of law at Stanford

career as

Richard A. Epstein has accepted
appointment as Professor of Law

Associate Professor at the

Law School. Prior to his joining
the faculty, he taught four years at

the

University of Southern

California Law Center, first as an
Assistant and then as an Associate
Professor.

Epstein, a native of Brooklyn,
York, received an A.B. summa
cum laude in Philosophy from
Columbia University in 1964, where
he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa
after his junior year. Having been
Mr.

New

Fellowship for
Study at Oxford, he received a B.A.
(Juris.) with First Class Honors from

awarded the Kellett

Richard A. Epstein

Oriel

College, Oxford University,

1966. In 1968 Mr.

Epstein

awarded the LL.B.

cum

Yale

University. While

Yale he

was

student

�ative

New

at

Editor of the Yale Law

Columbia

and his Ph.D. in

College

Columbia he received

Harlan Fiske Stone Moot Court

an

Fellowship,

teaching

in

Civil Procedure, Land Development
and Federal Taxation III. This

Ansley

President's

Fellowship,
Fellowship and

I.B.M. Watson

the
courses

a

a

Ford Foundation

Doctoral Dissertation

is
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1966 from Columbia. While at

Journal, a member of the Order of
the Coif, and Champion of the

Competition.
Mr. Epstein

Mr. Landes

Yorker,

received his B.A. in 1960 from

laude from
a

A

in

was

Award Nomination from

the Economics Department.
In 1965-66 he was an Assistant
Professor at Stanford. The

following

spring he is offering a seminar in
Roman Law, which will examine
selected topics in the Roman law

three years he was an Assistant
Professor of Economics at the

of contracts, torts and procedure.
N ext year he will teach the first

served

from 1969-1972

year contracts course.

Professor.

University of Chicago. He then

His

the

on

Essays

faculty
as an

at

GeofJrey R. Stone

Columbia

Associate

in Law and

Economics,

of the U. S. Court of

Volume 1 which he edited with

Gary

S. Becker is

he has
in the

published
area

forthcoming
numerous

and

currently serving

articles

Mr.

of law and economics.

a

group of

courses

and seminars in

course on

the

including
Economic Analysis of

Law.

,

Stone,

a

1971

graduate
accepted an

appointment as Assistant Professor
of Law, beginning in the fall
of 1973.
Mr. Stone

was

awarded

a

B.S.

in Economics in 1968 from the

Wharton School of Finance of the

University of Pennsylvania. While
at the Law School, Mr. Stone re
ceived the Joseph Henry Beale
work in the

WILLIAM MARTIN LANDES

Prize for

William Martin Landes has been

first year writing program. In his
second year he served as a staff
member of Law Review and con

appointed

Professor of Economics

in the Law School.

Currently

he is

Associate Professor of Economics at

the Graduate Center of the

City

outstanding

sequently

as

Editor-in-Chief of the

Law Review in his third year.
was graduated in 1971 cum

He

Evidence.

elected

a

Following graduation
Judge J. Skelly Wright

clerked for

Herrmann has been

Law

for the academic year 1973-1974.
Mr. Hermann has studied at the
universities of

Heidelberg, Basel,
Freiburg. He received his J.D.
degree in 1959 from the University
of Freiburg. The following year he
received an M. Compo L. degree
from Tulane University. For ten
and

years he then served' as Assistant at
the Max Planck Institute of Foreign

and International Criminal Law in

Freiburg where he was responsible
departments of American
law, English law, and international

for the

criminal law.
In 1971 he served

as

Universitats

the University of Freiburg
and then as Visiting Professor of
dozent

at

Law at the

University of Virginia

Comparative Law centered
criminal justice system.

of the Order of the Coif.

City.

HERRMANN

Mr. Stone

search Associate at the National
New York

Court.

courses including the
Regulation of Competition and

School of Law.

laude and

Bureau of Economic Research in

Supreme

member

University of New York and Re

was

to

Brennan of

appointed Visiting Professor of

of the Law School, has

William M. Landes

law clerk

teach

Joachim
GEOFFREY R. STONE
R.

for

At the Law School Mr. Stone will

JOACHIM

Geoffrey

as

Justice William J.

the United States

At the Law School he will teach

law and economics,

Appeals,

the District of Columbia. He is

At the Law School he will teach
on

the

DAVID C. EpSTEIN

Currently
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Assistant Professor of

University of North
Carolina, David G. Epstein will be
Visiting Associate Professor of Law
during the Winter and Spring
Law at the

of 1974.

Quarters

A native of Texas, Mr. Epstein
received his B.A. in 1964 and his
LL.B. in 1966 from the

of Texas

at Austin.

University

While in Law

School he received the Law Review
Research

Scholarship

and served

on

the Moot Court Board of Governors.
He

Associate Editor of the

was

Texas Law Review and
to

was

the Order of the Coif.

elected

In 1969

he received his LL.M. from Harvard

University.
on

Following graduation he clerked
the Texas Supreme Court. He

was

then associated with the firm

of Kramer, Roche, Burch, Streich
& Gracchiolo in Phoenix for three
years. In 1972 he became Assistant

James B. White

Professor of Law

at

the University

of North Carolina. In the

B. WHITE

JAMES

Currently

Professor of Law

at

University of Colorado,
James B. White will be Visiting
the

Professor of Law
Mr. White

Amherst

next year.

was

College

graduated from

with

1960. He received

and

an

an

A.B. in

A.M. in 1961

LL.M. in 1964 from Harvard

an

University. While at Harvard he
served as Treasurer and Book
Review Editor of Harvard Law
Review.
was

of

Following graduation he

associated with the Boston firm

& Eliot for two years.
He became Associate Professor of

Foley, Hoag

Law at the

University of Colorado

in 1967 and

was

made full Professor

there in 1971. His
terests

teaching
law,

in

This past year he was Visiting As
sistant Professor of Law at

Michigan

and this fall he will be

Professor
His

at

teaching

interests include

Commercial Law, Contracts, Cor
porations and Creditors' Rights.
At the Law School he will teach

Commercial Law and

Bankruptcy.

He is the author of Better Creditors'

Nutshell (West, 1973).
also to be published
by West, is Debtor-Creditor
Relations Teaching Materials.
Law in

a

Another

David G.

Owen M. Fiss

Visiting
the University of Texas.
a

book,

Epstein

NEW BOOKS

criminal law

procedure,
College Program,

seminar

and

a

covering materials he has

gathered together and which will
be published by Little, Brown
called The Legal Imagination.

BY THE

In mid-December

coursebook

by

FACULTY

Injunctions, a
Fiss, Pro

Owen M.

fessor of Law, was published by
The Foundation Press, Inc. as a
unit in its

University Casebook

publication these
adopted it: Emory,
Georgetown, George Washington,
Series. Since its

schools have

Harvard, New Mexico, Ohio State,

Pennsylvania,

San Francisco, and

South Carolina.
Mr. Fiss's

writing. Mr. White will teach
criminal

soon

year

was

include criminal

domestic relations, criminal pro
cedure, and legal research and

in the

same

awarded the Frederick B.
McCall Teaching Excellence Award.

he

new

coursebook, which

the remedial aspects of
equity, is innovative in several ways.
concerns

equitable remedy,
analyzed
depth with the hope
that the principles emerging from
this study can be applied to other
equitable remedies. The perspective
Injunctions,

is

on

one

in

injunctions is contemporary:

historical material is used

to

en-

lighten the present scene; only recent
cases, mostly labor, antitrust, First
Amendment and post-Brown civil
rights cases, are cited. With an
emphasis on the litigative process,
many procedural rules are analyzed

English common law criminal
procedure came under the influence
of Continental inquisitorial pro

from the injunctive perspective.
Legal Regulation of the Com

number of legal

petitive Process (The Foundation
Press, Inc., 1972), a new casebook

by

Edmund W. Kitch

J.D. '64, Pro

fessor of Law, written in collabora
tion with

Harvey Perlman, presents
materials, and notes on Unfair
Business Practices, Trademarks,
cases,

Copyrights

and Patents. The func

tion of this work is to revive the

teaching of that part of trade regu
lation not normally encompassed in
traditional antitrust study, such as:
the

common

tition, the

law of unfair compe

law appropria
tion doctrine, consumer actions, the
substantive law of the FTC, labeling
requirements, and promotional
common

practices such as lotteries, stamps,
premiums and coupons. Integrated
into the materials are the insights
of economists into the operation of
a market
system.
In his forthcoming book Prose
cuting Crime in the Renaissance:

England, Germany,

France

(Cam-

bridge, Mass., 1974), John H.
Langbein, Associate Professor

of

Law, refutes the conventional

view

a
practical tool of analysis with a
remarkably broad application to the
varied problems of the legal system.
The emphasis on concrete appli
cation rather than abstract theory
should be congenial to law students
and lawyers trained by the case

that

cedures. This book
across

the

cuts across

specialties
law/history line.

a

and

method.

In recent years, economists, and

lawyers with a bent for
analysis, have used the
theoretical and empirical methods of
economics to illuminate a variety of
issues and problems in the law.
Where formerly law and economics
intersected only in the fields of anti
trust and public utility regulation,
today one can find economic analysis
of crime control, accident law, con
tract damages, race relations, judicial
administration, corporation and se
curities regulation, environmental
problems, and other areas of central
concern in the contemporary legal
system. Economic Analysis of Law
(Little, Brown & Co., August 1973),
a new book
by Richard A. Posner,
Professor of Law, weaves exposition

The

University of Chicago Press
recently published Deterrence:
the Legal Threat in Crime Control,
written by Franklin Zimring, Pro

academic

has

economic

of the relevant economic

principles

a systematic survey of the rules
and institutions of the legal system.
In this book economics proves to be

into

fessor of Law and Associate Director
of the Center for Studies in Criminal

Justice, in collaboration with Gordon
Hawkins, Associate Professor of
Criminology, the University of
Sydney, Australia.
Deterrence is the first
to

law, and the social

sciences.

This

.

book tries
and

establish

to

philosophic basis

a

conceptual

for further

studies of deterrence and defines the
method of its research to this end.

deterrence has been

Although
considered

one

if not the

.purpose of the criminal

leading

justice

sys

tem, this book does not attempt to
debate whether punishment deters
crime.

Richard A. Posner

book-length

bring together empirical
and analytic discussions of deter
rence from the areas of
criminology,
attempt

Instead,

Deterrence investi

gates various factors which condi
tion the differential effects of legal
threats. In this

regard the authors
discuss differences among men and
types of crimes; variations in penalty
and risk of

penalty; factors that help
explain the success and failure of
leagl threats. Mr. Zimring and Mr.
Hawkins also consider methods of
comparing legal threats and propose
new areas of research.
Published
a

paperback

Foreign

by

the Law School is

book

by

Adolf

Sprudzs,

Law Librarian and Lecturer

in

Legal Bibliography, entitled
Information on Recent Treaties
Some Observations

on

Tools, Tech

niques, and Problems: The Conven
tional and the New. This publication
was originally "A
paper submitted to
the

Special

Section of the

Eighth
Congress of Com
parative Law, August 30-September
5, 1970, Pescara, Italy."
International
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Soia Mentschikoff and

t» Desha Lucas and Carl Lee '71

Not

MENTSCHIKOFF: A.A.L.S.
AND

only

students reside with
Washington Black

must

families in the

ANTIOCH

ghetto

for the first six weeks of

class, but they
In December Soia

Mentschikoff,

must

contact with the

also

same

come

into

institutions

Professor of Law, was named
President-elect for 1973 of the

which their "families" have contact
with. They must, for example, ob

Association of American Law Schools

serve

r

by

the Association

at its

annual

meeting in New York City. As

an

authority on commercial and inter
national law, Miss Mentschikoffs
chief contribution to civil legislation
has been the drafting of the U. S.
Uniform Commercial Code with her

late husband, Karl N. Llewellyn
who was Professor of Law at

Chicago from 1951-62.
Miss Mentschikoff is also Director

procedures at D.C. General
Hospital, spend a night in jail and
apply for welfare, etc. Classes are
also held in "The Lawyering
Process," which

context.

In the

of Curriculum
Antioch Law
D. C. This

Development at
School in Washington,

new

non-traditional law

school, which held its first sessions
September 1972, offers a cur

in

riculum

emphasizing clinical

tation and

an

orien

neutrality of the casebook

method.

In the first year curriculum the

real innovation is found not
in the content of courses,

the structure of these

but in

a

so

riculum,
civil procedure

courses

varies,

required living experience.

year

cur

property and
are required, there

four-month internships during
the year with Federal and D.C.
are

governmental agencies.
Miss Mentschikoff has also

cently

been named

a

re

member of the

Board of Trustees of the Rand
Corporation, the West Coast
"think tank."
At the December Convocation

much

although

proposed second
in which

open commitment to

the elimination of social in�ustice in
contrast to the academic and moral

is concerned with

lawyer-client relationships, and fact
collection and development in the
adversary process, and in "Legal
Decision Making," concerned with
the relationship between substance
and procedure in the adversary

ceremony in Rockefeller Memorial
Chapel Miss Mentschikoff presented
an

address

on

"Awareness."

Panel members, Philip B. Kurland, Phil C.
Neal, Gerhard Casper, Robert L. Stern, and
Richard A. Posner consider a question posed
during their discussion of "The Need for a
Puisne Supreme Court" at
Law Alumni Day 1973.
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The Ben Rothbaum Seminar Room Wll$
established in December, 1972 as a
memorial to her husband by Althea
Rothbaum.

J.D.
He

cum

was a

Ben Rothbaum received his

laude with the Class of 1921.
member of the Chicago firm

of Sonnenschein, Levinson, Carlin, N ath
& Rosenthal.

The Rothbaum Seminar

Room is the last seminar

room to be
named in the Law School complex.

LEGAL HISTORY WORKSHOP
THE

The

AT

made

LAW SCHOOL

The first meeting of The Legal
History Workshop of the Law School
was held in October 1972. The
of the

object

Workshop

is to

en

courage and to facilitate discussion
on legal history among students and

faculty

members of the Law School.

At the first

Hyman,

Hobby

Pro

held in

Professor of Economics at the Uni
versity of Rochester, spoke on "Law

Since the FBI does

education of law students. The
Rieser Fund was established in 1959
by his family and friends.

In the

of the

ON

issue of the Bulletin

Atomic Scientists Hans

on

Zeisel,
Sociology,
his study demon

strating how the FBI has been using
incorrect statistics "with a serious,
if unintentional and until

haps

even

now

per

unnoticed, bias toward

increasing the apparent

rearrest

and Force in Slave, Free, and Semi
Free Societies."

courts.

meeting of the Work

April 12, 1973, S. F. C.
Milsom, Professor of Legal History

shop

on

at the London

spoke

on

School of Economics

"Approaches

to

Legal

'

Mr. Zeisel's

recently completed
study now shows that statistics used
by the FBI comprised less than a
fourth of all defendents dismissed
or acquitted. This fourth was in

History." Professor Milsom is cur
rently Visiting Professor at Harvard

itself

Law School.

information of

a

biased sampling due

to

the

fact that the FBI did not receive
case

proportion of the

dispositions from

upon which

cases

on

the court.

Mr. Zeisel recommends that "a

group of
interests

specialists whose career
in objectivity and ac
curacy" compile and evaluate data
are

crime and that the FBI devote its

full energies

Professor of Law and
comments

properly file its
dispositions, the FBI
comprise an inaccurately large

the FBI bases its attack

on

FBI STATISTICS

January

cases

agencies which

before the federal courts.

federal court

Rieser, a prominent Chicago
attorney and former Lecturer in
Law, took a personal interest in the
affairs of the Law School, and in the

rates" of defendants who were dis
missed or acquitted by the federal

At the third

cases

Leonard M. Rieser Memorial Fund.

ZEISEL

February 1973. At
this time Robert M. Fogel, Professor
of Economics and History at the
University, and Stanley Engerman,
was

many other federal

bring

Mr.

meeting Harold M.

William B.

fessor of History at Rice University,
spoke on "The Reconstruction as an
Opportunity for Reform: Cities and
the Constitution."
The second meeting of the Work

shop

Legal History Workshop is
possible by funds from The

to

law enforcement

activities. As far back

as

Mr. Zeisel had made this

1969
recommen

dation in his report on the present
of crime statistics for the

state

President's Commission
Statistics.

on

Federal

Brief Notes from
the

Faculty
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In March 1973 Walter J.

Blum,

President. Mr. Dam is

on

leave of

Professor of Law, served as Chair
man of the panel on "Tax Reform

absence from the Law School and

Prospects" at The
21st Annual Management Con
ference, which was sponsored
jointly by The University's Graduate

sistant Director of the Office of

School of Business and the Executive

Professor of

Program Club, and held this

as

Proposals

and

year

at McCormick Place.

had served

previously

Management and

as an

taining

As

Mr. Katz has been

Budget.

Committee of the American His
Last November

N.

Katz,

Stanley
Legal History, presided

chairman of the session "Direc

Legal History"
Society for Legal
History, held in the Williamsburg
Lodge and Conference Center in
Virginia. Mr. Katz is Editor of
Studies in Legal History and of

at

the American

Gerhard Casper, Professor of
Science, has been

elected Vice President of the
Council of Lawyers.

Chicago

on

Economic

Policy,

capacity serves
George Shultz,

as a

and in that

deputy of

Assistant to the

Narrative

of the

John Peter

torical Association, which admin
isters a fund to support research in

legal history. He has also been
appointed to the Executive Council
of the newly formed Section on
Legal History of the American
Association of Law Schools.

Last December at the American
Bar Association Conference

the ASLH Newsletter.
The second edition of A

Kenneth W. Dam, Professor
of Law, has recently been appointed
Executive Director of the Council

appointed

Chairman of the Littleton-Griswold

tions in American

Law and Political

minutes of the earliest

recorded habeas corpus proceeding
in the American Colonies.

Creation of

Brief

Case and Trial

of
Zenger (Harvard, 1963),

a

on

the

National Institute of

Justice, Spencer L. Kimball, Pro
fessor of Law, provided one of the

r

of which Mr. Katz is editor, was
published by Harvard in January,
1973. It contains

duction and

a

a new

revised intro

appendix

con-

contributed papers on the subject
legal research and also served as

of

reporter for
groups.

one

of the discussion

Lodge and Conference Center in
Virginia. "The Origins of Official
Investigation and Prosecution of
Ordinary Felony in Sixteenth
Century England" was the title of
Mr. Langbein's speech, which he
presented in the session on "Police
and the Police Function."

The French government
inated Edward H. Levi

an

nom

Officer

Studies in Criminal
named

to

the

Justice, has been
special task force of

the Chicago Crime Commission.
The task force will investigate the
wide discrepancy between the num
ber of arrests and convictions for

criminal offenses in Cook County.
Mr. Morris was given the honor
of "Outstanding New Citizen of
the Year" by the Citizenship Council
of Metropolitan Chicago.

in the Order of the

Legion of Honor
this past January. On March 6th
the presentation of the award was
made

at Mr. Levi's house by
Philippe Olivier, Counsel General
and Minister Plenipotentiary of
France, who was accompanied by
Jean Beaulieu, Cultural Attache.
Membership in the Legion, es
tablished in 1802 by Napoleon I
as an

honor society similar

ancient orders of

Mr. Kimball's article "What Price,

to

knighthood,

Mr. Levi has also been elected

surance"

the Woodrow Wilson National

appeared

in the Wisconsin

Antitrust 'and

Monopoly

Sub

committee.

the Board of Trustees of

Fellowship

was

Assistant

Kitch, Professor of
appointed Special
to the Deputy
Attorney

General of the United States and
assumed his duties in Washington
at

the end of the last quarter.

In

February Philip B. Kurland,
Professor of Law, spoke to students
on

"The New

of the

Plan Com
Richard
by Mayor
J. Daley.
The Chicago Plan Commission
comprises a board of 15 citizens
and 8 public officials.

Chicago

mission

Edmund W.

Law,

Foundation.

Julian H. Levi, Professor of Urban
Studies, Division of Social Sciences,
has recently been appointed chair
man

Supreme

Court" at

the Woodward Court Lectures, a
series of informal lecture-discussions,

sponsored by Izaak Wirzup, Pro
fessor in Mathematics and the
College and Resident Master of
Woodward Court.

Bernard D. Meltzer, James Parker
Hall Professor of Law, has been
involved in various activities apart
from his

teaching responsibilities.

He served

as

Chairman of the

Hearing Committee

on

the Cook

County Hospital Dispute last spring.
Mr. Meltzer is a member of the
Subcommittee on International
Anti-Trust and Trade Regulations

of the American Bar Association.
He is also currently serving on the

Board of

Managers of the Chicago

Bar Association.

Last November

John

H.

Langbein,
spoke
Legal
the Williamsburg

Associate Professor of Law,
at the American Society for

History,

held in

H.

Palm,

Clinic, appeared on the "Perspec
talk-show, WLS, channel 7,

tives"

to discuss the

Mandel Legal Aid
Appearing with Mr. Palm
Law School students, Michael

Clinic.
were

is

bestowed by the French government
for only the most distinguished merit.
to

Review, volume 1972, issue #4.
In February 21, 1973 Mr. Kimball
gave testimony before the Senate

February Gary

the

'Price Disclosure?' The Trend to
Consumer Protection in Life In
Law

In

Assistant Professor of Law and Di
rector of the Mandel Legal Aid

Norval Morris, Julius Kreeger
Professor of Law and Criminology
and Director of the Center for

Associate Justice of the Supreme Court,
Harry Blackmun, rated the abilities of
competing law students in the Law School's
annual Hinton Moot Court Competition on
May 9th. U.S. appellate judges Harold

Leventhal and Wade H. McCree also sat
on the bench with him.
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Schatzow and Anne Hamblin

will be

Schiave, and staff attorney, John
They discussed the role of

Conference of the Second Circuit

well

as

Legal

Aid Clinic

at

the annual

Falls, Pennsylvania

to

discuss the operation of the Federal
jury system with the judges of the

as

the services the Clinic offers

Second Circuit. In

the community. Ranlet Lincoln,
Associate Professor of the New
to

Zeisel will

speak

particular

about the

Mr.

use

of

jurors in civil and criminal cases,
the comparative advantages and

Division and Dean of the

Collegiate
University Extention,
of "Perspectives."

guest speaker

in Buck Hill

Elson.

students in the

a

is moderator

disadvantages

of six-man and

juries with reference to
current studies which he is under
12-man

taking

Richard A. Posner, Professor of
Law, has been appointed by Presi

dent Levi

the

to serve on

Faculty Committee
Neighborhood.

with respect to juries.

University's

the

on

In October The 25th Annual

Federal Tax Conference

by

the Law School

was

sponsored

held in the

auditorium of the Prudential Build
In

May,

Max

Rheinstein,

Max

ing in Chicago.
Top business executives,

Pam Professor Emeritus of Com

parative Law, will be teaching

at

Strasbourg session of the Inter
Faculty of Comparative
Law; he will also be teaching at the
Amsterdam session in August.
the

national

Mr. Rheinstein is
associate

reporter

serving

Frederic W. Heckman, Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax

Policy-Designate

as

Arthur 1.

Max Rheinstein

the Science

on

account

ants, and tax lawyers from across
the nation attended the speeches:

Gould,

gave an address;
Winston and

Strawn in

of Law for the UNESCO survey
of Trends in Learning.

Chicago, spoke on
Planning for Real
Investments"; John S. Nolan,

"Trends in Tax
Malcolm P.

Sharp

Estate

Miller and Chevalier in Wash
on "The Merit

ington, D. C., spoke
This fall Malcolm P.

Sharp,
Professor Emeritus of Law, joined
the faculty of Rosary College in
River Forest, Illinois, as Chairman
of the Political Science Department.
Previous to this appointment Mr.
Sharp had taught for 30 years at
the Law School and for five years
at the University of New Mexico
Law School.

Mr.
in the

Sharp

also

University

the Winter

"Anarchy and
Nations." The
three major

Extension

Quarter.

Political Science

private foundations.

Lecturer

was a

He

course

Law

during
taught a

entitled

course

focused

Law School have been chosen

on

issues-anarchy and law,

crimes, and the cold war. In
relationship to these issues wars as
as

Vietnam and

the Greek

wars were

as

ancient

graduates of the
by
U. S. Supreme Court Justices to
join their clerking staffs this year.
John J. Buckley, Jr., formerly
Three 1972

Among the

war

recent

Conformity of Tax to Financial
Accounting"; Carl A. Stutsman, Jr.,
Hill, Farrer and Burrill in Los
Angeles, spoke on "Recent Devel
opments in Reorganizations."
Effects of the tax laws on philan
thropy were also discussed in
presentations on developments in
estate and gift taxes and a practical
guide to operating and terminating
in

as

discussed.

Editor-in-Chief of Law Review,
a member of the staff of

will become

Justice Louis F. Powell, Jr.
presently clerking for Judge
John Minor Wisdom, Fifth Circuit,
Associate

He is
In

September

1973 Hans

Professor of Law and

Zeisel,

Sociology,

New Orleans.

..
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A

frequent visitor

to

the

Midway, Professor

Emeritus Shelden Tefft expresses a mild
disclaimer to Professor Stanley Kaplan as
Nick Bosen '66 listens.

Presently serving as law clerk for
Judge Harold Leventhal in Wash
ington, D.C., Hal C. Scott, also a

LSA LECTURE

former member of Law Review,
will clerk for Associate Justice

sponsored

Byron

Robert I. Richter

was

chosen

by

A. Blackmun.

Justice Harry
Mr. Richter, formerly Comments
Editor of Law Review, is a clerk for
Judge Irving Goldberg of the Fifth
Circuit in Dallas.

JURISDICTIONS

"The Economics of

Inappropriate

Jurisdictions: The Stream Chan
nelization Controversy" is the title
of a speech given by John P. Brown,
Fellow in Law and Economics at the
Law

The Law Students Association
a lecture at the Law

by Robert

S.

Kasanof

Associate

School, during the Urban
Workshop, held at The
University this past February.

Economics

KASANOF

School last October

R. White.

INAPPROPRIATE

BY

JD '52, Attorney-in-Charge
of The Legal Aid Society, Criminal
Courts Branch, of New York City.
Mr. Kasanof spoke on "Poverty Law
for New York Criminals."

William Leuchtenberg, DeWitt Clinton
Professor of History at Columbia University
was speaker for the second annual William

Crosskey Lecture held

in the Law

School

Auditorium in February 1973. Mr. Leuchten

berg spoke

on

"A Klansman Joins the Court."

CHICAGO
In
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JURY

recent

a

STUDY CITED

Ford Foundation

Letter, The American Jury (Little,
Brown, & Co., 1966) by Professors Hans Zeisel and Harry
Kalven, Jr., was mentioned as one

scholarly works, which
supported as a research project

of the classic
was

the Ford Foundation.

by

It

also announced that Pro

was

fessor Kalven will
of

act as a

member

group of

prominent judges,
police officials, lawyers, and aca
a

demic authorities to advise and
review successive drafts for author

Charles E. Silberman, whose

study

of crime and justice the Foundation
is currently supporting. The Hon
orable Walter V. Schaefer

J.D. '28

of the Illinois Supreme Court is also
serving with this group of advisors.

WILKINSON ApPEARANCE
Last

January Frank Wilkinson,

executive director of the National

Committee

Against Repressive

Legislation, spoke
auditorium

on

in the Law School

"The Nixon Admin

istration and Civil

Rights."

Mr. Wil

kinson has the dubious distinction
of being one of the last persons

jailed by the

House UnAmerican

Activities Committee for contempt
of Congress. His appearance was

co-sponsored by

the Law Students

Association and Student Govern
ment.

WINNER

OF THE

WOMEN'S BAR

ASSOCIATION SCHOLARSHIP
Third year law student Marsha E.
Novick was awarded the annual
law

scholarship by

the Women's Bar

Association of the Illinois Foundation

last October. This award, named in
memory of the late attorney Mary

Shaw,

a

board of
year to

member of the foundation's

directors, is given each
outstanding woman law

an

student in Illinois. Miss Novick is
associate editor of Law Review.

photography credits
E. Carol

Stein, pp. 2, 40; Stephen Lew
38; Kathy McCartney '73, p. 41.

ellyn,

p.

Other

photography by John

Beal '73.
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